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I. OVERVIEW
This paper will discuss the various issues involved with the estate
tax deductibility of interest expenses for loans taken in order to pay
estate taxes. The basis for such deductions, taken against the gross estate, is found in § 2053 of the Internal Revenue Code, which allows deductions, inter alia, for administration expenses, 1) “as are allowable by
the laws of the jurisdiction.”1 The regulations provide the other two
principal requirements an administration expense must meet in order to
be deductible: 2) the expense must be “necessary,” and 3) it must be
“actually incurred.”2 What is actually required to satisfy these three elements has been developed in the Federal case law, the regulations, and
other I.R.S. materials. Section I of this paper provides an introduction
to the subject. Section II will discuss the necessity requirement. Section
III will discuss the actually incurred requirement. Section IV will discuss the state law allowability requirement.
A. Introduction
As far back as 1937, the courts have allowed deductions as administration expenses for loan interest payments on loans taken out to pay
Estate Taxes, either under § 2053 or its predecessors.3 There are several
1

See I.R.C. § 2053(a) (providing that deductions under this section are permitted
“as are allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction, whether within or without the United
States, under which the estate is being administered.”) The other enumerated deductions
in § 2053(a) are funeral expenses, claims against the estate, and unpaid mortgages or
indebtedness in respect of property under certain circumstances. Section 2053(b) allows
deductions for “other administration expenses,” which will be discussed infra at note 184.
All references to statutory sections and regulations are to the current Internal Revenue
Code and Regulations or to the parallel predecessor Code and Regulations sections. It
has been noted where there are relevant differences between the two. While any errors
are his own, the author would like to thank John A. Terrill, II, Esq., Lecturer in Law at
the University of Pennsylvania Law School, for his editorial suggestions, and Howard M.
Zaritsky, estate planning consultant, Rapidan, VA, for suggesting this topic for research.
Daniel Baltuch is an associate at Birns & Goff, PC, a law firm with a national practice in
State and Local Taxation. He lives in the Philadelphia, PA area with his wife and children, whom he also thanks. He can be reached at dbaltuch@birnsgoff.com.
2 Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a). The necessary § 2053 interest expense can be incurred
in order to pay Federal, State, or even foreign estate taxes, as long as it is permitted
under local law. Lisa M. Rico, Borrowing for Postmortem Liquidity, Part 1, 24 PROB. &
PROP. 50, 51 (2010) [hereinafter Rico, Part 1]. See § 2053(d) (allowing deductions for
certain foreign death taxes paid); Rev. Rul. 81-256, 1981-2 C.B. 183 (allowing interest
accruing on a state inheritance tax liability to be deducted under § 2053); Rev. Rul. 83-24,
1983-1 C.B. 229 (allowing a deduction for interest accrued on a late payment for a foreign
estate tax to the extent allowable under local law).
3 Estate of Huntington v. Comm’r, 36 B.T.A. 698 (1937) (holding to be deductible
all expenses necessary for the issuance and repayment of bonds issued by the estate to
raise funds to pay State and Federal estate tax and claims against the estate for the clear
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questions surrounding that general allowance, however. When are deductions permitted and when not? Deductions are allowed when expenses are 1) actually and necessarily incurred 2) allowable by state law,
3) were due and payable, and 4) were not previously deducted.4 But
what constitutes actually and necessarily incurred, what exactly must be
allowable under state law, and how can one know whether interest payments are due or will be paid? Within the question of whether expenses
were actually and necessarily incurred, there is the further question of
how the situation arose which made the loan interest expense necessary:
can it be contrived by tax planning or estate depletion, or would the
resulting expense be considered unnecessary? These questions, among
others, are relevant for estate planning for family owned businesses
which, in order to stay intact and maintain liquidity, must take loans to
pay estate taxes, and for estate administrators who, confronted with estate taxes to pay, must make decisions in the best interests of the estate.5
The potential tax savings involved in these interest deductions can be
quite substantial. For example, an estate in California which owed over
$200 million in estate taxes was able to save over $165 million in estate
taxes through a deduction for interest incurred in paying a loan taken in
order to pay estate taxes.6
The seminal modern case dealing with the issue and raising many of
the primary questions involved is Estate of Todd v. Commissioner.7 In
Todd, the estate borrowed $300,000 from Todd Cattle Co. to pay Federal and State estate taxes, and executed a promissory note for that
amount, payable on or before a date less than ten months later at 6.25%
interest per annum. The executors took out this loan to pay estate taxes
because the estate had no liquid assets, and they wanted to avoid selling
purpose of avoiding a sacrifice of assets and waste of the estate through an immediate,
forced sale).
4 TAM 9002001 (Jan. 12, 1990); TAM 8011009 (Nov. 29, 1979).
5 John J. Carpenter and Christian L. Perrin note that as the Service audits estate
tax returns from decedents who died just prior to the current economic recession and
assert deficiencies, estates may have difficulty paying those deficiencies because of significantly depreciated asset values. This makes the question of loans taken to pay estate
taxes particularly timely. John J. Carpenter & Christian L. Perrin, A Useful Tool in a
Time of Need: A Brief Synopsis and Analysis of IRC § 6161(b)(2), 24 PROB. & PROP. 62,
63 (2010).
6 Klein v. Hughes, No. A103940, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3788 (Apr. 20,
2004). The estate did not have sufficient liquidity to pay estate taxes immediately. After
negotiating the tax liability with the I.R.S., the trustees took a loan for about $50 million
to pay estate taxes. The loan was not pre-payable, and had a 25 year term at 8.75%
interest. Over $300 million of interest would have to be paid on the loan. This interest
expense was deductible (without a present value discount). After taking into account the
present value of income taxes paid by the lender on the interest income received from the
loan, the total savings to the estate was over $113 million. Id. at *4-6.
7 Estate of Todd v. Comm’r, 57 T.C. 288 (1971).
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assets at forced sale prices. The estate repaid the note nine and a half
months after taking the loan by transferring various mineral interests to
Todd Cattle Co., valued at the date of the decedent’s death at over
$375,000. The difference between the approximately $332,000 owed in
principal and interest and the value of the mineral interests was refunded to the estate in cash.8 The estate deducted the approximately
$32,000 interest payment on its estate tax return, and the Commissioner
disallowed the deduction.9 The court held that the expense was deductible as an administration expense under § 2053(a)(2).10 The court emphasized that § 2053(a)(2) allows deductions for administration
expenses, but “only as are allowable by the law of the jurisdiction . . .
under which the estate is being administered.”11 As such, the court held
the scope of “administration expenses” to be controlled by state law,
which in Todd, where Texas law applied, included interest expenses necessarily and reasonably incurred.12 The court also noted that the will
provided the executors with the power to borrow money to pay estate
taxes.13 The court placed the burden on the estate to prove that the
interest expense was “actually and necessarily” incurred under Treasury
Regulation § 20.2053-3(a). The court held that the estate had met this
burden because 1) the executor believed the loan necessary to pay estate taxes, 2) the estate had no liquid assets at the time, and 3) liquidation of illiquid assets at that time would have resulted in selling at
reduced prices.14 The I.R.S. acquiesced to the court’s decision in Todd,
but emphasized that the “actual and necessary” administration expense
test can only be met if the loan was “essential” so as not to run afoul of

8

Id. at 292.
Id.
10 Id. at 295. (explaining that § 2053(a)(2) provides that the value of the taxable
estate is determined by deducting “administration expenses” from the gross estate, “as
are allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction . . . .”).
11 Id.
12 Id. at 295-96. It is interesting to note that the transfer of mineral interests for cash
could have just as easily been effected at the date of death, instead of as a loan. It is
difficult to see the “necessity” to take a loan where a simple transfer was possible. See
infra text accompanying notes 51-53 (discussing Estate of Black v. Commissioner, 133
T.C. 340 (2009)); see infra text accompanying note 79 (discussing Estate of Gilman v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-286, 86 T.C.M. (RIA) 1814 (2004)).
13 Estate of Todd v. Comm’r, 57 T.C. 288, 296 (1971).
14 Id. There are two separate elements which the estate must prove, one under
State law and one under § 2053. Under State law, the executor must have the authority
to take a loan for administration purposes. Under § 2053, the estate must also meet the
“actually and necessarily incurred” test. In Todd, these two requirements happened to
use very similar tests. Id. See discussion of State law infra at Section IV.
9
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Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-3(a), as opposed to non-essential loans
incurred for the benefit of “heirs, legatees, or devisees.”15
The Ninth Circuit in Hibernia Bank v. United States laid out a policy
rationale for the deductibility of administration expenses generally. The
court reasoned that the estate tax is a tax on the transfer of property,
and not on the decedent’s property itself. As such, only the value of the
gross estate actually transferred to the beneficiaries should be taxed,
and administration expenses, which reduce the value of the property
transferred, are therefore allowed as deductions from the value of the
estate. Those expenses which do not represent true liabilities of the estate, however, but are incurred for the benefit of the heirs, legatees, or
devisees, ought not to be deductible under this rationale as they are not
true expenses incurred in administering the estate.16
15

Estate of Todd v. Comm’r, 57 T.C. 288 (1971), action on dec., 1973-451 (Apr. 23,
1973). The Chief Counsel reasoned that if the estate did not qualify for “undue hardship” (since amended) under § 6161(a)(2) (allowing extensions for payment of estate tax,
see infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text), the interest which accrued on loans were by
definition not “actual and necessary” administration expenses, and as such could be nothing other than for the benefit of the beneficiaries. See also Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a)
(providing that “the expenses contemplated in the law are such only as attend the settlement of an estate and the transfer of the property of the estate to individual beneficiaries
or to a trustee . . . . Expenditures not essential to the proper settlement of estate, but
incurred for the individual benefit of the heirs . . . may not be taken as deductions.”).
The § 6161(a)(2) standard was changed from “undue hardship” to “reasonable cause” in
the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2004(c)(1). The regulations, however,
have retained a discretionary “undue hardship” (defined as “more than an inconvenience
to the estate”) allowance for deductions. The regulations also give examples of undue
hardship. Treas. Reg. § 20.6161-1(a)(2). See also Carpenter & Perrin, supra note 5, at 6364. See infra note 25.
16 Hibernia Bank v. United States, 581 F.2d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that
expenses incurred while an estate was kept open for seven years in order to sell a mansion so that the beneficiaries could receive cash instead of shares of the property were not
necessary for the administration of the estate, but were for the benefit of the beneficiaries). But see David H. Brockway, Comprehensive Estate and Gift Tax Reform, 67
TAX NOTES 1089, 1104-1105 (1995), quoted in BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (9th ed. 2005) (arguing that the estate tax is imposed on the
taxable estate as of the date of death, meaning that that value is not altered by subsequently accruing interest (including that incurred by administration expenses), which
should therefore not be deductible, and that allowing deductions for interest payments
creates a perverse incentive for executors to lengthen estate tax controversies for as long
as possible to defer payment of estate taxes and reduce the real cost of the estate tax).
See also Joseph M. Dodge, Lifting the Shroud Obscuring Estate of Hubert: The Logic of
the Income and Estate Tax Treatment of Estate Administration Expenses, 3 FLA. TAX.
REV. 647, 659-660, 669-671 (1998) (arguing that only debts and claims arising pre-death
should be deductible through the estate tax, whereas those arising after death (including
administration expenses) should be deductible through the Federal income tax only, because adjustments to the value of the estate after death are not reductions in the value of
the net estate, but rather merely reductions in post-mortem accretions).
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1) § 6166 extensions for closely held businesses and § 6161
extensions for reasonable cause
The Internal Revenue Code permits extensions, through §§ 6166
and 6161, for paying estate taxes under certain circumstances. When an
extension is granted, the estate is required to pay interest on deferred
payments. This arrangement is essentially a constructive loan from the
government to the estate.17 Consequently, the interest expenses for de17

In Estate of Bahr v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 74 (1977), the court addressed the
issue of whether projected interest expenses for payment of estate taxes on a § 6161
deferment plan are deductible. The court cited § 2053(c)(1)(B), which provides that
taxes are not deductible as administration expenses. The court then wondered whether
interest on deferred estate tax payments is more properly characterized as part of the tax
(and therefore non-deductible), or as something else (and therefore deductible). Id. at
77-78. The Commissioner, arguing that the interest should be treated as tax, and therefore as non-deductible, suggested that language in § 6601(e)(1) implies a Congressional
intent to treat “interest. . .in the same manner as tax.” Id. at 78-79. (Section 6601(e)(1)
deals with “Interest on Underpayment, Nonpayment, or Extensions of Time for Payment, of Tax.” See infra note 18.) The court held that the Commissioner’s reading of
§ 6601 was contrary to well-established case law, and that the rule is that “interest on tax
is not a tax, but something in addition to a tax.” Id. at 79 (quoting Capital Bldg. & Loan
Ass’n v. Comm’r, 23 B.T.A. 848, 849 (1931)). Therefore, the interest expense was deductible. Id. The court reasoned that denying a deduction for interest payments would
be tantamount to imposing a penalty on estates which do not have sufficient taxable
income to benefit from a deduction for the interest on their income tax returns. Id. at 82.
But see id. at 83-84 (Tietjens, J., dissenting). See discussion infra of Keller v. United
States, No. V-02-62, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95500 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2010) at note 57.
Once the interest expense was held deductible, the court was able to hold that in § 6161
deferment plans, the government takes the role of a lender, with the same result for
deductibility as if interest payments had been paid to a third party lender. Bahr, 68 T.C.
at 82. See also Estate of Spillar v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1985-529, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 1285,
1289 (1985). The court also referenced Ballance v. United States, 347 F.2d 419 (7th Cir.
1965), which held interest payments non-deductible on the same facts as in Bahr. The
Ballance court reasoned that the interest, if deductible, would reduce the amount of the
taxable estate, and thus would reduce the total amount of estate tax paid. The court
criticized that decision as an aberration and its reasoning as faulty. Taken to its logical
conclusion, the Bahr court wrote, the Ballance court’s reasoning would result in disallowing all administrative expenses because they ultimately reduce the estate tax payable – an
untenable conclusion. See Bahr, 68 T.C. at 81-82. But see Estate of Street v. Comm’r,
974 F.2d 723, 729 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirming that the value of administrative expenses,
interest payable on Federal and State estate taxes, and on deficiencies in both do not
reduce the value of the marital deduction). See also Dodge, supra note 16, at 663-69
(discussing the effect of estate tax administration expense deductions on marital deductions in the context of the Supreme Court case, Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 520
U.S. 93 (1997), which held that marital deductions need not be reduced). See TAM
8705002 (Oct. 8, 1986) (holding that interest payments on deferred estate tax do reduce
the amount of property passing to the spouse for § 2056(a) purposes). The marital deduction issue was decided in Hubert, 520 U.S. 93, and regulations were issued in response.
See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4(a). See also T.D. 8846, 1999-2 C.B. 679 for further
explanation.
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ferred estate tax payments have historically been treated as deductible
administration expenses under § 2053. In the Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997, Congress disallowed § 6166 interest deductions for decedents dying after 1997 and, to compensate for that disallowance, provided a special low interest rate.18 Nevertheless, for analytic purposes, § 6166
extensions are the equivalent of a loan from the government to pay estate taxes, regardless of whether the interest expenses are especially low
or generate an estate tax deduction instead. In a number of cases and in
I.R.S. materials discussed in this paper which preceded the 1997 Act,
they are treated as such.19
Section 6166 elections are available for estates with closely held
businesses. By making a § 6166 election, an estate can defer payment of
estate taxes for up to five years, and then make ten yearly installment
payments with interest. The estate stays open for the duration of the
deferral.20 To qualify for a § 6166 deferral, the estate’s interest in a
closely held business must be at least 35% of the adjusted gross estate
(that is, the estate less the expenses which are allowed as deductions
under § 2053), and the amount of estate tax which can be deferred is
proportional to the percentage of the estate which is made up of that
interest.21 Relatively few estates qualify under this 35% rule, and even
18 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 503 (codified as amended at
I.R.C. §§ 163(k), 2053(c)(1)(D)). The rate is set by § 6601 at 2% for a portion of the
estate, and at 45% of the rate for underpayments of taxes for the balance of the estate.
BITTKER, supra note 16, at 637. See §§ 6166(f); 6601(j); Francis J. Antonucci & Robert
Whitman, After Death Tax Planning: Minimizing Tax Liabilities, ALI-ABA 100 (2004).
Executors must determine whether it is more economically advantageous to enjoy the
low 2% interest rate without an estate tax deduction, or to take a third-party loan for a
potentially higher interest rate with a deduction for all interest payments. Dennis I.
Belcher, How to Meet Liquidity Needs in a Private Business Owner’s Estate Using IRC
Section 6166, IRC Section 303, and Graegin-Style Promissory Notes, 43 U. MIAMI HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. 44 (2009).
19 Section 2053(c)(1)(D) provides that “[n]o deduction shall be allowed under this
section for any interest payable . . . for the period during which an extension of time for
payment of [estate] tax is in effect under section 6166.” The clear negative implication is
that, but for this provision, interest payments for § 6166 deferrals are allowable as deductions. This same conclusion is shown throughout the case law and I.R.S. materials as
well, as will be discussed below. For an example, see Rev. Rul. 78-125, 1978-1 C.B. 292
(allowing interest payments under § 6166 to be deducted as administration expenses).
20 Gregg M. Simon, Handling Closely Held Business Interests and Other Special Assets, in ESTATE PLANNING FOR ILLINOIS ATTORNEYS: THE BASICS AND BEYOND 40
(2005).
21 BARRY W. JOHNSON ET AL., RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 77 (William G. Gale et al., eds., 2001). Between 1995 and 1998, the percentage of estates electing § 6166 deferrals declined from 1.7% to 1.2%, with 63.4% as the average percentage
of the estate’s estate tax being deferred. Id. It should also be noted that because of the
operation of § 2035(c)(2), transfers made within three years of death are included in the
gross estate for the 35% test. BITTKER, supra note 16, at 637. Also, the statute, being
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those which do qualify often elect not to defer under § 6166 and take a
commercial loan instead. This is because, under § 6324, a Federal tax
lien is imposed on the estate in the amount of the deferred tax in order
to secure the debt. Such liens can make future borrowing or maintaining an operational line of credit difficult for the estate.22 Furthermore,
future installment payments required under § 6166 can cause a strain on
the cash flow of the business.23
Section 6161 allows, for “reasonable cause” (and at the Service’s
discretion), an initial extension of estate tax due for up to 12 months and
then for successive annual extensions of up to ten years.24 Section
6161(b)(2) allows discretionary extensions for up to four years for tax
which has been determined as a deficiency (and which was not shown on
the tax return as due). The deficiency, however, must not be due to
negligence, intentional disregard of rules and regulations, or fraud, and
reasonable cause must be shown to receive the extension.25 Unlike
designed for active businesses, has restrictions on passive investments and holding companies. Id. Interests in multiple businesses can be aggregated to reach 35% under certain circumstances. Id. See § 6166(c). Lifetime planning, such as by either acquiring
other business interests or gifting or otherwise divesting non-business interests at least
three years prior to death can make qualification for a § 6166 deferral more likely. Simon, supra note 20, at 37-38. For a thorough summary of the rules and limitations involved in § 6166 elections, see Barry M. Nudelman, Federal Taxation of Estates, Gifts,
and Trusts, ALI-ABA 356-357 (1999); Lisa M. Rico, Borrowing for Postmortem Liquidity, Part 2: A Primer on IRC § 6166, 25 PROB. & PROP. 47 (2011); and Antonucci &
Whitman, supra note 18, at 97-112.
22 JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 78. Farmers in particular have difficulty in this
regard because they often use short-term loans to purchase seeds and supplies at the
beginning of the growing season. Id. Another concern is that any undistributed net income for an installment payment year must be applied to the installment payment for
that year. BITTKER, supra note 16, at 638.
23 PLR 200020011 (May 19, 2000). Though estate tax payments can be deferred, the
first five years of interest payments on the deferral are due annually, while subsequent
interest payments are due at the time of estate tax installment payments. § 6166(a)(3).
24 § 6161(a)(1), (2). The installment payment period is allowed for a “reasonable”
period of time. Id. See BITTKER, supra note 16, at 636. These extensions are for taxpayer-determined amounts, reported on the estate tax return, as opposed to deficiencies
which are determined later. Section 6163 allows a similar postponement for payment of
estate taxes on reversionary or remainder interests included in the gross estate, but not
created by the decedent’s own testamentary act, for six months and three years respectively, upon showing of “reasonable cause.” Interest on late estate tax payments is also
deductible, regardless of why the payment was late, as long as local law allows it. § 6621;
Rev. Rul. 81-154, 1981-1 C.B. 470. The interest rate for § 6161 deferrals is the federal
short-term rate, determined quarterly, plus three percentage points. § 6621. See Carpenter & Perrin, supra note 5, at 64. A significant difference between § 6166 elections and
§ 6161(a)(2) deferrals is that § 6166 is elective, whereas § 6161(a)(2) is subject to the
Service’s discretion. Antonucci & Whitman, supra note 18, at 99.
25 Nudelman, supra note 21, at 355. For limitations, see § 6161(b)(3). For examples
of reasonable cause, see Treas. Reg. § 20.6161-1(a)(1). Examples listed there include 1)
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§ 6166 interest payments, § 6161 interest payments for extensions can
still be deductible for federal estate tax purposes. Note, however, that
the Service can require a bond or a lien to secure the extension.26
II. NECESSITY

FOR

DEDUCTIONS

FOR

ADMINISTRATION EXPENSE

Section 20.2053-3(a) states that only expenses actually and necessarily incurred in the administration of an estate are deductible as administration expenses.27 The necessity of the deduction is a major factor.
There are three primary indicators which courts have focused on in determining what could be termed prima facie necessity: 1) ongoing liquidity needs of the estate, 2) lack of liquidity of estate assets, and 3) the
need, if no loan is taken, to make a forced sale of those illiquid assets to
achieve liquidity.
At the most basic level, deductions are allowed when an estate’s
liquidity at the time of borrowing is insufficient to make required tax
payments and provide for maintenance of estate property pending distribution. In Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, the estate had sufficient liquid assets to pay a significant portion of the estate tax owed.
However, because the estate had ongoing expenses, including property
the executor not being able to immediately take control of estate assets due to asset
dispersion among several jurisdictions, 2) an insufficiently liquid estate being mainly or
substantially composed of future payment streams such as annuities, copyrights, or accounts receivable against which the estate could only borrow at a loss, 3) the value of the
estate is unascertainable because a claim is subject to litigation prior to collection, and 4)
the estate has insufficient funds to pay the entire estate tax when due and simultaneously
reasonably provide for the decedent’s widow and dependent children and pay claims
against the estate (assuming the executor has made reasonable efforts to convert assets
into cash). Id.
The “reasonable cause” requirement under § 6161 can be understood as a threshold
provision similar to the “necessarily incurred” provision of § 2053. See infra note 27 and
accompanying text. The same can be said for § 6166, where deferral, as a threshold matter, is only permitted for closely held business interests which meet the qualification requirements under the statute (as is consistent with the policy behind § 6166 to save
closely held businesses from forced sales). See also BITTKER, supra note 16, at 438 n.4,
637.
Section 6161 extensions can be especially useful in cases where assets are expected to
appreciate substantially in the four years after the decedent’s death. Carpenter & Perrin,
supra note 5, at 64.
26 § 6165. The bond cannot exceed the value of the deficiency by more than twice.
27 Allowable § 2053 “Administration expenses” are defined in Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2053-3(a) as including “miscellaneous expenses,” which are in turn defined in
§ 20.2053-3(d) as “[e]xpenses necessarily incurred in preserving and distributing the estate, including the cost of storing or maintaining property of the estate if it is impossible
to effect immediate distribution to the beneficiaries.” These expenses include interest
expenses incurred through loans taken to pay estate taxes, which are considered part of
the process of distributing the estate.
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tax payments, two employee salaries, and wages for other laborers, it
needed to maintain its liquid assets, and took a loan from the decedent’s
insurance trust to pay estate taxes. The court held that even though the
estate had other liquid assets, the estate did not need to deplete its liquid resources in order to avoid taking a loan.28 More specifically, for a
loan interest expense to be considered necessary does not require the
estate to deplete all of its liquid assets.29
If an estate is not sufficiently liquid to cover its estate tax obligations, and would need to sell non-liquid assets to cover the tax expense,
courts and the Service have paid particular attention to the “forced”
nature of that contemplated sale of assets. Deductions have been allowed when the estate did not own any non-liquid assets and would
have had to sell non-liquid assets at reduced prices to pay the taxes.30 In
Estate of Graegin v. Commissioner, the estate lacked adequate liquidity
to pay estate taxes, and the executors decided to take a loan from
Graegin Corporation rather than sell stocks.31 The court held that the
loan was “actually and necessarily incurred” by the estate, in satisfaction
of Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-3(a), because 1) the estate lacked liquidity and 2) it borrowed to avoid a forced sale of its assets.32 In Estate
of Gilman v. Commissioner, the court affirmed that interest on funds
borrowed to pay taxes or other debts of the estate are deductible if the
estate was illiquid at the time of the borrowing. The court defined illiquidity as “while the estate can obtain funds to pay those expenses only
through sale of estate assets at a price below the normal market
price.”33
28

Estate of Thompson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-325, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 426, 432

(1998).
29

Id.
See Estate of Graegin v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1988-477, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 387
(1988); Estate of Sturgis v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1987-415, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 221 (1987);
Estate of Todd v. Comm’r, 57 T.C. 288 (1971). In two private letter rulings, the Service
allowed a deduction when a debt was incurred to avoid forced sale of assets of the estate,
(rather than to pay interest on pre-death obligations, or otherwise for the individual benefit of the beneficiaries of the estate). PLR 9449011 (Dec. 9, 1994); PLR 200020011 (May
19, 2000). In Hibernia Bank v. United States, 581 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1978), the executors
raised the argument that they had held the estate open for seven years because of a lack
of marketability for stocks owned by the estate. The court did not reach that argument,
however, because it ultimately determined that the estate had been held open only for
other reasons. Id. at 744. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
31 Graegin, T.C. Memo. 1988-477, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) at 389.
32 Id. at 390.
33 Estate of Gilman v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-286, 86 T.C.M. (RIA) 1814, 1823
(2004). It is also important to note that, following Rule 142(a)(1), the court laid the
burden of proof in all contested issues on the estate.
But see Pitner v. United States, 388 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding that the amount
of an otherwise necessarily incurred expense must be reasonable); I.R.S. 1989 Litig.
30
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A. Business Judgment of the Estate Administrator and the Burden
of Proof
While courts all acknowledge the necessity requirement and some
level of deference to executors’ business judgment, two general approaches have been taken as to how to balance them when they conflict.
Some courts have deferred to executors’ business judgment on the question of necessity. In Estate of Sturgis v. Commissioner, the court found
that where executors decided to take a loan to pay estate taxes rather
than to sell assets of the estate, executors’ judgment should not be second-guessed by the court unless the fiduciary was shown to have acted
other than in the best interests of the estate.34 Moreover, because the
court held that the fiduciaries/executors in Sturgis had necessarily incurred a loan to pay estate taxes, it found the executors “prudent indeed
to have anticipated contingencies such as an increased estate tax liability.”35 Similarly, in Estate of Murphy v. United States, the court held
that loans taken from both a Family Limited Partnership and trusts created by the decedent were “actually and necessarily incurred” administrative expenses under § 2053 and Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-3(a),
and were therefore deductible.36 The court held that borrowing money
to pay estate tax for an illiquid estate, as was the case in Murphy, is a
necessarily incurred administrative expense under § 2052.37 The Commissioner argued that interest expenses were not necessarily incurred
because the Estate could have obtained funds to pay estate taxes by
Guideline Mem. TL-65, 9 (Mar. 14, 1989) (warning that, based on Pitner, if a loan transaction is “completely out of line with normal commercial alternatives that were demonstrably available” that at least part of the expense could be challenged as unnecessary).
34 Sturgis, T.C. Memo. 1987-415, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 221.
35 Id. The court in McKee v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-362, 72 T.C.M.
(CCH) 324 (1996), also deferred to the executors’ business judgment, praising the executors for their good judgment, similarly to the Sturgis court. In McKee, executors borrowed funds rather than selling stock which they believed was going to increase in value,
and which was not publicly traded (and therefore less marketable). The court reasoned
that beyond simply raising capital to pay estate taxes, such a decision could enable the
estate to more easily meet its tax burdens by taking advantage of the increase in stock
value as well. McKee, T.C. Memo. 1996-362, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) at 331. The court also
apparently considered the immediate payment of the estate taxes, which was only possible because the estate took a loan from a third party, to redound to the estate’s favor. Id.
at 330-331. (In general, the McKee decision presents an excellent summary of many of
the key relevant cases – up until 1996 – on the topic of this paper.) But see Estate of
Black v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 340 (2009) (holding that increased estate tax liability alone
does not constitute necessity, regardless of the executor’s business judgment), discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 51-53.
36 Estate of Murphy v. United States, No. 07-CV-1013, 2009 WL 3366099, at *21
(W.D. Ark. Oct. 2, 2009).
37 Id. at *24. The court cited Estate of Todd v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 288 (1971),
and McKee, T.C. Memo. 1996-362, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 324 to support this holding.
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other means, such as selling assets.38 The court held, however, that executors are not required to set aside “good business judgment” when
they are administering the estate, and that if the executor acted in the
Estate’s best interest, his actions will not be second-guessed by the
court.39 Simply because there was no evidence that the executors were
acting other than in the estate’s best interests in deciding to borrow
rather than liquidate assets to cover estate tax expenses, the court declined to second-guess the executors.40
The Sturgis and Murphy decisions are outliers in granting so much
deference to executors’ judgment. Usually the burden of proof is placed
on the estate to prove the necessity of the loan.41 In Rupert v. United
States, for example, the major asset of the estate was a right to a stream
of future annual lottery payments. The estate took a loan to pay estate
taxes, though it could have sold the income stream to raise the funds to
pay estate taxes instead.42 The court determined that the estate had the
burden of proof for showing that the interest expense was necessary.43
The court described the test of necessity as whether the estate can
“show that the loan avoided some harm to the estate,” and held that the
estate would have to provide factual details to support such a showing.44
In Estate of Stick v. Commissioner, the “Stick Trust,” (the residual
beneficiary of the Stick estate), borrowed $1.5 million from the “Stick
Foundation” with a ten year repayment term to pay State and Federal
estate taxes.45 The estate reported deductible administration expenses
38

Murphy, 2009 WL 3366099, at *23.
Id. at *22. This, despite the fact that the executors and the owners of the partnership were the same. See infra text accompanying notes 96-98.
40 Murphy, 2009 WL 3366099, at *22.
41 T.C. R. 142(a)(1) (2009). See supra note 33.
42 The court discussed the permissibility of selling or assigning lottery winnings
under Pennsylvania state law, finding that it was permissible in this case. Rupert v.
United States, 358 F. Supp. 2d 421, 424-25 (M.D. Pa. 2004).
43 Id. at 425.
44 Id. The court was deciding on a summary judgment motion brought by the estate,
and ruled in favor of the estate pending this proof of harm to the estate. Considering that
the estate had already provided an expert to testify that the estate was better off monetarily by borrowing than by selling assets, it stands to reason that the court understood
there to be a higher bar; that is, losing the chance for an improved financial situation is
not considered harm. This is in direct contrast to language in Estate of Sturgis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-415, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 221 (1987), and Estate of Murphy v.
United States, No. 07-CV-1013, 2009 WL 3366099 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 2, 2009). The estate
had also argued that their fiduciary judgment should not be second-guessed. Compare
this position with that taken in Estate of Gilman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-286,
86 T.C.M. (RIA) 1814 (2004), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 76-81.
45 Estate of Stick v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-192, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 194 at *2
(2010).
39
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including over $656,000 of interest expense on the loan.46 The court
held that the estate was not entitled to the deduction on the loan under
§ 2053(a)(2). Section 2053(a)(2) provides that “the value of a decedent’s taxable estate shall be determined by deducting from the value of
the gross estate such amounts for administration expenses as are allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction under which the estate is being administered.”47 The court held that under Treasury Regulation § 20.20533(a), “the amount of deductible administration expenses is limited to
those expenses which are actually and necessarily incurred in the administration of the estate.”48 Because the estate made no showing that the
loan actually was necessary, it lost as a matter of procedure.49 The court
also noted that the liquid assets of the estate exceeded its estate tax
obligations (excluding interest expenses on the loan).50
Business judgment has also been held not to be the sole determinant of necessity when the decision to borrow in order to pay estate
taxes was made solely to generate a deduction, without any other economic substance. The court in Estate of Black v. Commissioner held
that a loan to the estate from a limited partnership owned by the executor (who was also the principal beneficiary of the estate) was unnecessarily incurred and therefore non-deductible under § 2053, despite the
estate being illiquid without the loan. The court reasoned that, unlike
cases where loans from family owned partnerships were found to be
necessarily incurred to avoid forced sales or to retain the lender’s stock
for future appreciation,51 in Black, the lender himself had to sell illiquid
assets to raise the money for the loan to the estate.52 The court determined that because the lender sold the very same assets to raise the cash
for the loan as the executor would have had to sell to cover the estate
tax liabilities of the estate in the first instance, the estate did not really
have a liquidity problem. Therefore the only difference between lending the money raised by the sale of assets and using the money from that
sale of assets to pay the estate taxes directly was a large interest expense
deduction, which the court disallowed.53
By contrast, the court in Estate of Keller v. United States held
against the Commissioner’s argument that the estate had borrowed
46

Id. at *2-3.
Id. at *3.
48 Id. at *2.
49 Id. at *4-5 (citing T.C. R. 142 (2009)).
50 Stick, T.C. Memo. 2010-192, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 194 at *5.
51 E.g., McKee v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-362, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 324 (1996); Estate of Graegin v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1988-477, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 387 (1988), Estate of
Todd v. Comm’r, 57 T.C. 288 (1971).
52 Estate of Black v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 340 (2009).
53 Id. at 383-84.
47
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solely to generate a deduction. In Keller, the court noted that “[t]he
amounts deductible from a decedent’s gross estate as ‘administration expenses’ . . . are limited to such expenses as are actually and necessarily
incurred in the administration of the decedent’s estate; that is, in the
collection of assets, payment of debts, and distribution of property to
the persons entitled to it.”54 Accordingly, the court found that interest
paid by an otherwise illiquid estate on a loan incurred to pay estate
taxes and other obligations of the estate “without forcing the sale of its
illiquid properties” was allowable as a deduction.55 The deduction was
granted to the estate as a refund from estate taxes already paid.56 The
Commissioner argued that the loan was created for the sole purpose of
generating a deduction and therefore lacked economic substance such
that it would be honored as legitimate for tax purposes.57 The court
54 Keller v. United States, No. V-02-62, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73789, at *57 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 20, 2009) (quoting Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a), Graegin, T.C. Memo. 1988-477,
56 T.C.M. (CCH) 387, Estate of Thompson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-325, 76 T.C.M
(CCH) 426, 432 (1998)), aff’d, Keller v. United States, No. V-02-62, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 95500 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2010).
55 Keller, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73789, at *57.
56 Id.
57 Keller, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95500, at *6. The court, quoting Kimbell v. United
States, 371 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2004), agreed that the application of Federal income tax
economic substance doctrine for loans should apply equally to Federal estate tax cases.
Keller, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95500, at *6. The three part test urged on the court by the
Commissioner in Keller was that used for Federal income tax purposes in Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United States, 568 F.3d 537, 544 (5th Cir. 2009). Keller, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 95500, at *6. (As follows: “1) The transaction has economic substance compelled
by business or regulatory realities, 2) it is imbued with independent tax considerations,
and 3) it is not shaped totally by tax avoidance features.”) In Klamath, the court held
that lack of economic substance invalidates a transaction regardless of whether the taxpayer had motives other than tax avoidance. Klamath, 568 F.3d at 544. Compare Keller,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95500 at *5, *6 and I.R.S. 1989 Litig. Guideline Mem. TL-65, 6
(Mar. 14, 1989) with Estate of Black v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 340, 340 (2009). Note in this
connection, however, that the § 2053(b) allowances for administration expenses appear in
the case law to be more permissive than the more restricted federal income tax § 163
delineated allowances for interest deductions. Section 163(h) does not permit an income
tax deduction against income of the estate because income tax deductions for interest on
indebtedness under § 163 are not allowed for “personal expenses.” “Interest paid on
indebtedness properly allocable to a trade or business or to property held for investment”
is not considered a personal expense. § 163(h)(2). The Service has held that estate administration expenses are personal expenses because the interest is allocable to the payment of tax and not to business or investment assets, and because the tax comes from the
transfer of estate assets, which is not a business or investment activity, regardless of the
business or investment assets in the estate. PLR 9449011 (Dec. 9, 1994). This seems
somewhat inconsistent with the reasoning in Keller, described above. See also Rico, Part
1, supra note 2, at 51; Simon, supra note 20, at 40. Section 163 income tax deductions,
which are disallowed for post-death estate administration expenses, should be distinguished from § 642(g) elections for § 691(b) income tax deductions (deductions in respect
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concluded that the loan in Keller passed the economic substance test,
however, because 1) it imposed liability in the event of default, 2) it
applied interest at the federal rate, 3) millions of dollars of interest had
already been paid on the loan, 4) those interest payments were reported
as income to the partnership, and 5) the loan’s purpose was to preserve
the estate’s liquidity.58
B. Who Caused the Illiquidity and How Was the Illiquidity Caused?
If the reasons behind an estate’s liquidity issues are questionable,
the necessity of a loan taken to pay estate taxes as a result of that illiquidity can also come into question. The case law has dealt with three
ways in which an illiquidity necessitating loans to pay estate taxes is
caused in the estate: 1) pre-death transfers of liquid assets out of the
estate by the decedent in exchange for illiquid assets, including partnership interests in Family Limited Partnerships (which raises the question
of whether the sale of assets was bona fide), 2) a decedent rendering his
estate functionally illiquid for purposes of paying estate taxes by providing in his will that estate taxes cannot be paid from liquid assets, and 3)
executors transferring liquid assets out of the estate in exchange for illiquid assets.
1) Pre-death transfers of liquid assets in exchange for illiquid
assets
In Estate of Murphy v. United States, the court assessed whether a
decedent’s pre-death sale of estate assets to a Family Limited Partnership and a Limited Liability Company, which resulted in estate illiquidity and necessitated a loan to cover estate tax expenses, was includable
in the gross estate under § 2036(a)(1) and (2). Many inter vivos transfers that are testamentary in nature are includable in the gross estate,
but if transfers consist of a “1) bona fide sale 2) for adequate and full
consideration in money or money’s worth,”59 then they are excludable
from the gross estate.60 To fall under the “bona fide sale” exception to
§ 2036, the sale must 1) be made in good faith 2) with some potential
benefit other than estate tax advantage; if the transfer is entirely motiof a decedent), which are allowed for expenses accrued and enforceable by the time of
the decedent’s death either under § 691(b) or under § 2053(a)(3) for claims against the
estate. See infra note 92 (discussing accrual of expenses pre- versus post-death). See
generally Edward Schnee, Interest Deduction for Individuals: Review and Update, 12 AKRON TAX J. 181 (1996) (discussing general treatment of interest deductions allowable
elsewhere in the Internal Revenue Code).
58 Keller, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95500, at *7.
59 § 2036.
60 Id.
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vated by tax savings with no business purpose, it is ignored for tax purposes.61 The Commissioner argued that the interest expense from loans
taken from family partnerships was not necessarily incurred because the
need to take the loans was a result of “an unnecessary estate-tax-avoidance transfer” made by the decedent during his lifetime, which drained
his future estate of liquid assets.62 The court rejected the Commissioner’s argument for three reasons. Firstly, the partnerships were created in good faith and for legitimate and significant non-tax reasons.63
Secondly, the decedent kept personal assets, over 50% of his total
wealth, separate from the partnerships in amounts sufficient to cover his
living expenses for the rest of his life as well as his estate tax expenses.64
Thirdly, the need to borrow money to pay estate taxes resulted not from
a wealth-depletion scheme, but rather from a fall in value of the decedent’s separate, personal assets.65 The transfer of funds to the partnerships therefore fell under the “bona fide sale” exception, meaning it was
a legitimate transfer, and the loan taken to pay estate taxes as a result of
the consequent illiquidity in the estate could be held a necessary and
therefore deductible administration expense, assuming it met all other
requirements for deductibility.66
In Estate of Keller, another recent case, the court also had to determine whether the creation of Family Limited Partnerships caused a le61

Estate of Murphy v. United States, No. 07-CV-1013, 2009 WL 3366099 (W.D.
Ark. Oct. 2, 2009).
62 Id. at *24.
63 The partnerships were created for multiple purposes, including to centrally manage family assets in a manner consistent with the decedent’s investment strategy. The
court held that this was a significant and legitimate non-tax purpose for the partnerships.
Id. at *9.
64 Id. at *24.
65 Id. The Murphy court further pointed out that the decedent was not standing on
all sides of the transaction – there were other family members who took an active role in
the partnerships. Id. at *22. The court held that knowledge of the tax advantages does
not prevent an otherwise genuine sale from being bona fide. Id. at * 23 (citing Kimbell v.
United States, 371 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2004)). Furthermore, the court held that the type of
investment strategy which the partnership was formed to propagate – whether active
management or passive “buy and hold” (as was the case in Murphy) – was irrelevant;
either is a sufficient non-tax justification for the partnership’s formation. Id. (citing Estate of Schutt v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-126, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1353(2005)). To be
“for adequate and full consideration” under § 2036, a transfer must satisfy the three part
Kimbell test: 1) the interest in the partnership received is proportionate in value to the
assets contributed to the entity, 2) the value of each partner’s contribution is credited to
that partner’s capital account, and 3) on termination or dissolution of the partnership,
each partner is entitled to distributions from the partnership in amounts equal to their
respective capital accounts. Id. (citing Kimbell, 371 F.3d at 266). In Murphy, the court
held that the transfer of assets met these three criteria, and was therefore properly excluded from the gross estate. Id. at *25.
66 Id. at *24.

Winter 2011]

ESTATE TAX DEDUCTIONS

423

gitimate illiquidity in the estate such that a loan was necessitated.67 The
Keller court also invoked the § 2036 rule that transactions motivated
solely by potential tax advantages are ignored for purposes of bona fide
sales for adequate and full consideration, and made a similar analysis on
somewhat different facts which indicated a bona fide sale.68 Firstly,
lengthy discussions about the creation of the partnerships provided objective evidence of a “real, actual, genuine, and not feigned” transaction.69 Secondly, the primary purpose of the partnerships was to protect
assets from depletion by ex-spouses through divorce – a “legitimate business purpose.”70 To that end, the partnerships were designed to consolidate and protect family assets for easier management and inheritance.71
Therefore, resultant estate tax savings were merely incidental, and the
partnerships were not primarily for estate tax avoidance purposes.72
Thirdly, though much of the estate’s assets would pass to the partner-

67

The Commissioner argued that no liquidity problem even existed because the
estate had already liquidated its assets to pay taxes prior to the loan being entered into.
The court held that a liquidity problem did in fact exist. Pointing to the facts of the case,
the court found that though the executors did not originally think that the partnership
had been established prior to the matriarch’s death, it had in fact been established and
funded under Texas state law, and therefore the estate was, retroactively, illiquid at the
time that it drew the loan from the partnership. Therefore the loan was taken to preserve
the estate’s liquidity, and interest on it could be deductible if the other requirements for
deductibility were met. Keller v. United States, No. V-02-62, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
95500, at *7-8 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2010).
68 In Keller v. United States, advisors to the family matriarch did not feel, at the time
of her death, that a Family Limited Partnership had been formed because she died before
several formalities could be accomplished to fund the partnership. The estate therefore
paid estate tax of over $147 million, drawn from liquid assets of the estate. Keller v.
United States, No. V-02-62, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73789, at *31 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 20,
2009). The court found that despite a year passing after the death of the matriarch, Texas
State contract law required the executors of the estate to complete the transactions surrounding the partnership’s creation, and that the partnership was in fact “fully formed”
and funded prior to her death. Id. at *33-34. Thus, when the estate later borrowed $114
million from the partnership to pay additional estate taxes and other administration expenses so as not to threaten the liquidity of the estate over a year after the matriarch
died, the court found that the interest paid on the loan was deductible. Id. at *36-37, *57.
69 Id. at *52.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at *11-12, *52. Also, that family members made only de minimus contributions to the partnership did not in and of itself require a conclusion that the sale was a
sham. Id. at * 51-52.
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ships, the matriarch would retain over $110 million at her disposal.73
The loan was held necessary, and its interest deductible.74
2) Decedent renders his estate functionally illiquid through a will
provision
An interesting question arises as to whether a liquidity “problem”
can be legitimately caused by a will provision directing that estate taxes
not be paid from liquid assets of the estate. In Estate of Thompson, a
will provision directed all estate taxes should be paid from residue, and
no claim be made on any life insurance beneficiary for purposes of paying estate taxes. The court considered this to be a legitimate cause of
“illiquidity,” and implied that, but for this provision, the estate could
have been forced to pay estate taxes from other liquid assets of the estate, rather than take a loan.75

73

Id. at *22, *52. The court emphasized that a “transferor retaining sufficient assets
outside of the partnership to meet his personal needs supports the conclusion” that the
transfer was a bona fide sale. Id. at *51. Accord Estate of Murphy v. United States, No.
07-CV-1013, 2009 WL 3366099 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 2, 2009) (emphasizing the same). The
court also applied the objective Kimbell test to determine whether the transfer was a
good faith sale for full and adequate consideration (as opposed to a sham transaction or
disguised gift) under § 2036. See Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 264 (5th Cir.
2004). The estate in Keller passed the Kimbell test. Keller, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73789,
at *53. The court further distinguished the Keller case from Strangi v. Commissioner, 417
F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2005), where a decedent had retained enjoyment of assets transferred
to a partnership and the Fifth Circuit inferred an implied agreement to that effect and
pulled those assets back into the estate under § 2036. Keller, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
73789, at *54. Here, the court determined, the sort of circumstantial evidence of an implied agreement which led to the court’s conclusion in Strangi was absent, the matriarch
did not retain enjoyment of the transferred assets, and the sale was bona fide. Furthermore, the transfer in Strangi was found to be for entirely estate tax avoidance purposes,
unlike in Keller. Id. at *55. The circumstantial evidence in Strangi was that the decedent
transferred almost his entire wealth to the partnership, and in fact relied on funds of the
partnership to fulfill his financial needs after the transfer. The decedent there also continued living in a residence which had been transferred to the partnership. Id. at *54.
Ironically, the court maintained its distinction from Strangi on these grounds despite the
fact that the matriarch in Keller did continue to enjoy the assets which were later transferred to the partnership, because the partnership was not formally created and funded
(albeit retroactively) until over a year after her death. See discussion of Strangi infra note
118.
74 Keller v. United States, No. V-02-62, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73789, at *57 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 20, 2009).
75 Estate of Thompson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-325, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 426,43334 (1998). See supra text accompanying note 28.
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3) Executors transfer liquid assets out of the estate in exchange
for illiquid assets
In Estate of Gilman, the estate acted on advice to save on capital
gains tax (by transferring out assets rather than selling them), and executed a tax free restructuring under § 368. As part of this restructuring,
executors transferred assets of the estate to an LLC owned exclusively
by a foundation created by the decedent, in return for which the estate
received notes payable in equal amount.76 Because the assets transferred were “illiquid” according to the court’s definition,77 the court
held that the estate was illiquid both before and after the transfer to the
LLC.78 Of course, the clear inference from this holding is that if the
executors had in fact caused the illiquidity of the estate which necessitated the loan, the interest expenses on that loan would not be
deductible.
The Gilman court also dealt with the question of whether, because
the estate could have avoided taking a loan to pay estate taxes by selling
estate assets rather than restructuring and transferring them for notes
payable at a later date, the interest expenses on that loan were not deductible after all. The decision to restructure in order to save the estate
from paying capital gains tax was a reasonable act on the part of the
executors, the court held, and the court refused to substitute its judgment for that of the executors in that decision to transfer assets out of
the estate.79
76 Estate of Gilman v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-286, 86 T.C.M. (RIA) 1814, 181415 (2004).
77 See supra text accompanying note 33.
78 Gilman, T.C. Memo. 2004-286, 86 T.C.M. (RIA) at 1823.
79 Id. at 1824. The court ruled the loan necessary within the meaning of Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2053-3(a). The court not only considered the transfer reasonable and the consequent need for a loan necessary, but also ruled that another, later loan taken by the
estate to pay estate taxes was also necessary: the LLC was unable to pay interest on the
notes because of an unforeseeable decline in positive cash flow in the LLC’s business
holdings, and the court ruled that a loan taken by the estate to cover this shortfall in
paying its estate taxes was also necessarily incurred. Id. at 1823. Interestingly, the estate
originally elected to pay its estate tax in ten annual installments under § 6166. The estate
was informed, however, that its transfer of funds under the § 368 restructuring jeopardized its § 6166 election, and made an acceleration of estate tax payments possible under
§ 6166(g). To avoid that possibility, the executors instead paid the estate tax in full, necessitating a loan. The court ignored the original § 6166 election despite the Commissioner’s argument to the contrary that the possibility of repaying over a ten year term
made loans to the estate unnecessary. See id. The implications of the Commissioner’s
argument, had it been successful, are significant. The Commissioner could argue, for
instance, that the mere availability of a § 6166 election and consequent possibility of
avoiding taking a loan would make many loans unnecessary, perhaps even in cases where
the interest rate or terms of a private loan were more favorable than a § 6166 deferral.
Presumably, this argument would not be salutary after the passage of the Taxpayer Relief
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One further point bears mentioning with regard to liquidity. Borrowing is only necessary to cure illiquidity as long as the estate is actually illiquid. In Gilman, the estate borrowed funds to pay Federal and
State estate taxes, and the court deemed that borrowing necessary.
However, the court limited the necessity of the borrowing to a specific
term. The estate was due to receive payment on outstanding notes,
which would make the estate liquid. The court held that the due date
for those notes was the last date on which the borrowing was necessary,
and therefore loan terms beyond that due date were unnecessary.80 The
estate was only allowed to deduct interest and closing costs that accrued
up to that date.81
C. Administration Expense or Claim Against the Estate?
When a decedent borrows money before death, the principal and
interest payments on that loan become the executors’ responsibility after death. In such cases, the decedent does not necessarily take the loan
to achieve liquidity in order to enable his estate to pay estate taxes.82
Are post-death interest payments on these loans deductible administration expenses?83

Act of 1997. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. See also McKee v. Comm’r, T.C
Memo. 1996-362, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 324, 330-31, 333 (1996) (refuting the same position
which the Commissioner took in Gilman, T.C. Memo. 2004-286, 86 T.C.M. (RIA) 1814,
and stating that “there are circumstances in which an executor may reasonably choose to
obtain a private loan on behalf of an estate, even though the estate could qualify for
section 6166 deferral.”); Rev. Rul. 84-75, 1984-1 C.B. 193 (acknowledging the same).
80 Gilman, T.C. Memo. 2004-286, 86 T.C.M. (RIA) at 1824.
81 Id. The court also only allowed deductions for interest payments on those portions of the loans which were used to pay Federal and State estate taxes, but not those
used for expenses which the court held were unnecessary.
82 This topic is included in this paper because of the planning possibilities it
presents, as an alternative means of achieving liquidity for paying estate taxes (in which
case it might be viewed constructively as a loan taken to pay estate taxes), or for other
purposes. Namely, the § 2053 necessity requirement does not apply to loans taken out by
decedents before death. The payment of interest expenses is nevertheless considered
necessary and deductible, as discussed below. Alternatively, if the proceeds of the loan
are used to purchase illiquid assets, this type of action by the decedent could also be
considered a fourth scenario for causation of estate illiquidity.
83 Until now this paper has largely confined itself to § 2053(a)(2) administration
expense deductions. This section raises the related issue of § 2053(a)(3) deductions for
claims against the estate. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4, which provides rules for deductions for
claims against the estate, allows deductions for the personal obligations of the decedent
which existed at the time of his death, limited to bona fide claims which are enforceable
against the estate and not unenforceable when paid. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4(a)(1).
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In Estate of Webster v. Commissioner, the decedent took loans prior
to her death which she used to purchase United States Treasury bonds.84
After her death, the unpaid balance for the loans was over $3.5 million.
The executors continued to make loan payments, and deducted the interest incurred after the decedent’s death pursuant to § 2053(a)(2).85
The court considered the loan to have been “necessarily” incurred as an
administration expense, because the loan was taken prior to the decedent’s death, and the loans, including interest, became the responsibility
of the executors after her death. The court saw “no requirement” for
the executors to retire the debt to stop further running of interest, even
if they could have done so.86 The court took into account the possibility
that, given other items in the estate, the estate may have lost money
through raising capital to retire the loans, and thought it was “eminently
reasonable” for the executors to continue paying interest instead.87
In Estate of Wheless v. Commissioner, three years later, the court
dealt with facts similar to those in Webster, and was urged by the Commissioner to characterize the interest which accrued after the decedent’s
death on pre-death loans taken by the decedent as a § 2053(a)(3) expense for claims against the estate, and not as an administrative expense
under § 2053(a)(2). The executors sold readily marketable assets of the
estate but did not sell assets which could only have been sold at sacrifice
prices. The estate, still short of the liquid capital necessary to retire all
of the decedent’s debts, renewed some of the decedent’s loans and paid
off others when they came due.88 If the interest expense were characterized as a § 2053(a)(3) claim against the estate, the Commissioner contended, Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-4 would govern.89 Treasury
84

Estate of Webster v. Comm’r, 65 T.C. 968, 971 (1976). The bonds were later sold
by the executors to pay estate tax. Id. at 969.
85 Id. at 971. The court also dealt with whether post-death interest which accrued
on the estate’s gift tax liability was deductible when paid under § 2053(a), as an administration expense, in light of the fact that the payment of gift tax was not unduly delayed.
Id. at 980-81.
86 Id. at 980-81. The court did not reach the question of whether the executors
could, in fact, have done so. It is also possible that the inquiry would not need to be
made if the loan terms preclude prepayment, which opens further planning possibilities.
See discussion of Estate of Graegin v. Commissioner, infra at text accompanying notes
129-139.
87 Webster, 65 T.C. at 982. It is unclear whether the holding would have been the
same had it been clear that the executors could have made money through selling property of the estate to raise funds to retire the debt. If that were the case, presumably the
executors would have taken that course of action instead, and there would have been no
dispute. It is also unclear from the opinion how significant it was, if at all, that the estate
used the proceeds of the original loans to pay estate taxes.
88 Estate of Wheless v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 470, 470-72 (1979).
89 Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4 governs § 2053(a)(3) deductions for claims against the estate, but not § 2053(a)(2) administration expenses. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4 (2009).
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Regulation 2053-4 only allows deductions for claims against the estate
for interest on personal obligations of the decedent which have already
accrued at the time of the decedent’s death (but have yet to be paid at
the time of death), but would not allow deductions for claims against the
estate for interest accruing on personal obligations of the decedent after
the date of death. The debts would thereby remain the personal obligation of the decedent, and would not be considered to have been incurred
by the executors for the benefit of the estate.90 The court rejected this
reasoning, holding instead that maintaining and renewing the debts was
necessary and prudent in the best interests of the estate and in fulfillment of the executors’ fiduciary duties (having assumed the debts upon
their appointment as executors), given the liquidity situation of the estate.91 The court explicitly rejected the proposition that for interest expenses to be deductible as administration expenses under § 2053(a)(2),
the debt must have been incurred by the executors rather than by the
decedent.92
90

Wheless, 72 T.C. at 474-75.
Id. at 475-76. The court held that just because the regulation precluded the postdeath interest from being a deductible claim against the estate did not mean that the
interest was not deductible as an administration expense. The court read the regulatory
language of “personal obligations of the decedent” to merely limit claims against the
estate to those debts for which the decedent was personally liable. Id. at 478. The court
also emphasized that the executors had sold the assets which they could sell at reasonable
prices in an attempt to retire the debt as soon as possible. The court did not seem to
think this was dispositive, however. Id. at 472, 476-77 (quoting Webster v. Comm’r, 65
T.C. 968 (1976) to this effect). The court proceeded to make the standard three prong
analysis (actually incurred, necessarily incurred, and allowable under the laws of the jurisdiction), finding in favor of the estate. Id. at 479-80.
92 Id. at 476. But see Charles D. Rubin, Regulations Shift Burden of Uncertain and
Contested 2053 Claims and Expenses to Taxpayers, 112 J. TAX’N 139, 139 (2010) (characterizing – with a bright line distinction – administration expenses as events occurring
after death, and claims against the estate as obligations already present at the date of
death, even if post-mortem events will determine the final value of the claim). This obliquely raises the question of how ascertainable the value of interest expenses are. See
infra text accompanying notes 175-201. There has been a circuit split on the issue of
taking post-death events into account in determining claims against the estate, with older
cases in the First, Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits considering them in valuing claims
which were uncertain at the date of death, and more recent cases in the Fifth, Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits refusing to consider them. Steve R. Akers, Final Regulations Under Section 2053 Governing Estate Tax Deduction For Administration Expenses
and Claims Against Estates, ACTEC (Nov. 2009), http://www.actec.org/public/AkersFinal
2053Regs.asp. See also Nudelman, supra note 21, at 238-40. Recent regulations in 2009
have addressed this issue. See infra text accompanying notes 93-95. See also Rev. Rul.
77-461, 1977-2 C.B. 324, in which the Service determined that only interest which had
accrued at the date of death is deductible as a claim against the estate, and that interest
on installment obligations contracted by the decedent before his death but accruing after
his death can only be characterized as claims against the estate, and not as administration
expenses associated with “winding up of the estate,” but that if the executor obtained an
91
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Recent regulations under § 2053 in 2009 have rendered one issue in
Estate of Wheless moot.93 Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-4(a)(2) now
provides that “[e]vents occurring after the date of a decedent’s death
shall be considered in determining whether and to what extent a deduction is allowable under section 2053. See § 20.2053-1(d)(2).” Therefore,
regardless of whether an interest payment is characterized as paying a
claim against the estate or an administrative expense, post-death events
are definitively taken into account, provided that these events meet the
requirements of Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-1(d)(2).94 This new regulation removes one practical ramification of the different
characterizations.95
D. Who Benefits from the Loan Transaction?
Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-3(a) provides that “expenditures not
essential to the proper settlement of the estate, but incurred for the individual benefit of the heirs, legatees, or devisees, may not be taken as
deductions.”96 Courts have hesitated to allow deductions when the
lender is also the beneficiary, especially when he is also the executor,
but such an identity of interest has not been dispositive. Courts have
almost universally held that this Regulation precludes deductibility for
extension of those same obligations – that is, postponing payment on the obligations – to
avoid a sacrifice sale of assets, any additional interest expenses would be considered administration expenses and deductible rather than “mere pre-death obligation of the decedent.” The Service also distinguished from cases where the executor paid pre-death
obligations accruing post-mortem in an effort to preserve the assets of the estate generally, that is, with a “nexus between the payment and the administration.” This revenue
ruling also corresponds with the Service’s non-acquiescence to the holding in Webster v.
Commissioner. Rev. Rul. 77-461, 1977-2 C.B. 324. Interest on pre-death indebtedness is
deductible as a deduction in respect of a decedent under § 691(b).
93 In fact, the recent regulations have come into line (with a clarity previously lacking) with the holding in Wheless, 72 T.C. 470.
94 Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-1(d)(2) provides that post-death events in general
are taken into consideration until the expiration of the statute of limitations as described
in § 6501, without limitation if and when the statute of limitations is suspended, and after
the statute of limitations has run in determining overpayments of tax due connected to a
timely filing of a refund claim as prescribed in § 6511(a). See infra note 184.
95 See Rubin, supra note 92, at 139. See also Lisa K. Johnson, Comment, The IRS’s
Flawed Solution to the Controversy Over Deductible Claims Against the Estate and the
Necessity for a Date-of-Death Standard, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 789, 807-811 (2009)
(arguing that a universal date of death valuation for all claims and expenses would be
more equitable). See generally Anna Meresidis, The I.R.C. § 2053(a)(3) Controversy:
Should Events After Death Affect the Value of Estate Tax Deductions For Claims Against
the Estate?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2705 (2002) (addressing the date of death valuation
controversy).
96 See Estate of Gilman v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-286, 86 T.C.M. (RIA) 1814,
1824-25 (2004).
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interest expenses on loans which are taken solely for the benefit of the
beneficiaries, but not those which incidentally benefit, or at least do not
primarily benefit, the beneficiaries.97
In McKee v. Commissioner, the executors of the estate were also
the directors of the Company which issued the loan to the estate. However, the court did not disallow the interest deduction for this reason;
the executors were not shown to have acted other than in the best interests of the estate, so the court declined to question the executors’ business judgment, and the conflict of interests was not dispositive.98
In Estate of Thompson, the beneficiaries of the estate undoubtedly
benefited from the estate taking a loan to pay estate taxes because it
enabled the estate to hold onto stocks which were increasing in value.
However, the estate also benefited from that arrangement. The court
held that such “dual benefit” does not in and of itself bar the interest
expenses’ deductibility.99 The court allowed the deduction for interest
expenses, despite the dual benefit, because 1) market predictions regarding the stocks were “very uncertain” and 2) the benefit to the beneficiaries from holding the stocks for appreciation was not the sole or
even principal reason for taking the loan instead of selling the stocks,
because the estate had liquidity problems which necessitated the loan.100
In a 2000 Private Letter Ruling, the Service allowed a deduction for
interest paid on a commercial loan obtained by the estate to prevent a
forced sale of assets (a closely-held business in the gross estate).101 The
deduction was allowed despite a clear benefit to the principal beneficiary. Though the principal beneficiary was “incidentally” benefitted,
since it was not “solely” for her “individual” benefit, and was instead
necessary to preserve a significant asset of the estate and avoid a forced
sale of assets, the Service considered the loan reasonably and necessarily
incurred.102 That is, there must be some interest of the estate served by
taking a loan to pay estate taxes as distinct from the interests of the
beneficiaries.
97

This issue is closely related to the question of whether the loan is bona fide, discussed infra, beginning at text accompanying note 117. The question of who benefits
from the loan is both a factor used in determining whether the loan is bona fide and an
independent inquiry as well.
98 McKee v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-362, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 324, 331 (1996). The
court went even further, praising the executors for their prudence in selecting to take a
loan from a third party rather than elect § 6166 deferment, because this allowed the estate to benefit from increases in stock value and cushioned the estate from unforeseen
contingencies such as increased estate or gift tax liabilities.
99 Estate of Thompson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo, 1998-325, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 426, 433
(1998).
100 Id.
101 PLR 200020011 (May 19, 2000).
102 Id.
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Comparing the net worth of the parties (or party) to the loan
before and after the loan is probative of whether the loan was taken to
benefit the estate, or for the sole benefit of the beneficiaries. If there is
no net change of value aside from the estate tax saving for the deduction, it indicates that the loan was taken for the sole benefit of the beneficiaries, and the interest is not deductible. In Estate of Black v.
Commissioner, the court emphasized that the lender, who was the principal beneficiary of the estate, was also representing the borrower as
executor, and was in effect paying interest to himself.103 The court
noted that the payments resulted in no change in his net worth, with the
exception of the estate tax savings from the interest deduction.104 As
the Commissioner phrased it, the transfer of funds was circular, with no
economic effect other than the estate tax deduction generated.105 If so,
the court held, the interest expense was unnecessarily incurred, and
could not be deducted.106
Loans from related parties are also suspect because the arrangements can appear to be circular. In a 2004 Private Letter Ruling, the
Service said that a deduction was not allowed for interest payable on
funds loaned to an estate (to pay estate taxes) by a partnership in which
the estate owned a 99% interest (and in which estate beneficiaries
owned a 100% interest).107 The Service said that the loan was not necessary because the partnership, which had the liquid assets to pay the
estate’s expenses, was not engaged in any active business that would
require retention of those liquid assets, and because closely related family members who had proportionate interests in the partnership and in
the estate were on all sides of the transaction.108 Based on the partnership’s liquidity and the terms of the loan, the Service concluded that the
loan was only made to obtain an up-front estate tax deduction for the
interest expense.109 The Service also said the interest expense was not
deductible because it was questionable if the estate would actually make
payments under the arrangement, and even if the estate made those
payments, it would have no economic impact on the parties involved,
that is, no relative change in net worth of the parties would result from
the loan.110
103

Estate of Black v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 340 (2009).
Id. at 385.
105 Id. at 382-83.
106 Id. at 385. See also infra note 136.
107 PLR 200449031 (Dec. 3, 2004).
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 TAM 200513028 (Apr. 1, 2005). The deduction was disallowed even though the
loan was not pre-payable and had a ten year term.
104
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A 1989 Litigation Guideline Memorandum states that with “balloon payment loans,” where all or substantially all of the interest is due
in single payment at the end of the loan term, and the estate administrator seeks to deduct the entire interest expense up front as an administration expense, although the interest deduction may be allowed in certain
circumstances, the I.R.S. will challenge it when related parties have no
need for the borrowing.111 Also, unusual terms such as unsecured loans,
high interest rates, and long terms112 will be closely scrutinized, especially if less expensive lending was available from third parties. The Service said it will attempt to disallow administration expenses incurred
“solely for the benefit of the heirs,”113 by arguing that a particular loan
structure was an unnecessary expense when the transaction was out of
line with normal commercial alternatives available to that estate at a
shorter term or at a significantly lower interest rate; alternatively, if the
balloon arrangement was necessary, the I.R.S. will argue that the full
amount of interest obligation was not necessarily incurred.114
Estate of Wheless is an outlier on this subject. In Wheless, the court
seemingly conflated the interests of the estate and those of the heirs.
Believing that the executors had paid interest on the decedent’s debts so
that the estate would be administered and settled advantageously to the
beneficiaries, it held that the debts were actually and necessarily incurred and that the interest was therefore deductible.115 The court explained this ruling somewhat, writing that the executors, when avoiding
a forced sale of assets, must have been acting to settle the estate and pay
off creditors while at the same time preserving as much as possible of
the estate for beneficiaries, based on their duties to both creditors and
beneficiaries.116
111

I.R.S. 1989 Litig. Guideline Mem. TL-65 (Mar. 14, 1989) (released after the Service lost in Estate of Graegin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-477, 56 T.C.M. (CCH)
387 (1988)).
112 It is somewhat counterintuitive that a long loan term counts against a transaction.
Generally, longer loan terms call for lesser scrutiny.
113 Estate of Posen v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 355 (1980).
114 I.R.S. 1989 Litig. Guideline Mem. TL-65 at 11-15.
115 Estate of Wheless v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 470 (1979), nonacq., 1982-2 C.B. 1. “We
believe that the economic circumstances of a particular estate may dictate the postponement by an executor of payment of a decedent’s debts in order that the estate be administered and settled advantageously insofar as the beneficiaries of the estate are concerned. In
such event we believe the interest accruing on such debts is ‘actually and necessarily
incurred in the administration of the decedent’s estate. . ..’” Wheless, 72 T.C. at 476.
(emphasis added). This is apparently in direct contradiction to Treas. Reg. § 20.20533(a).
116 Wheless, 72 T.C. at 479. The court summarized the executors’ actions approvingly
as being in the “best interests” of the beneficiaries with a “due regard” for the creditors.
Id. at 480. This understanding of the executor’s fiduciary responsibilities as primarily to
the beneficiaries may allow the holding to fit in with the Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a) lan-
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E. Bona Fide Loan? (and Graegin-Type Notes with Reasonably
Certain Balloon Payment Provisions)
Closely related to the question of who benefits from the loan is the
question of whether the loan is bona fide. Section 2053(c)(1)(a) provides that for indebtedness or claims against the estate founded on a
promise or agreement, only that portion of the agreement which was
“contracted bona fide and for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money’s worth” is deductible. In general, courts use objective
multi-factor facts and circumstances tests to determine whether a loan is
bona fide, or is really disguised equity or a disguised distribution.117 In
Estate of Rosen v. Commissioner, for instance, the court considered the
following factors to weigh towards the finding of a bona fide loan: the
issuance of an actual note, a fixed maturity date and repayment schedule, an interest rate and actual interest payments made, a source of repayment other than from earnings, non-identity of interest between an
ownership interest and the debt owing, security for the loan, an ability
to find comparable financing from a third party, lack of subordination of
the debt to other creditors’ claims, actual use of the funds transferred,
and the establishment of a “sinking fund” to repay the note.118
guage: “the expenses contemplated in the law are such only as attend the settlement of
an estate and the transfer of the property of the estate to individual beneficiaries. . ..”
(emphasis added). Other courts, however, have taken a different approach to interpreting these regulations, allowing deductions for expenses incurred which inure to the “incidental” benefit, or at least not the primary benefit, of the beneficiaries. It is possible that
the Wheless court had a fundamentally different view of what estate administration is –
that is, of what its goals should be – than the regulation as understood by other courts.
Other courts may have understood administration as a backward-looking “wrapping up”
of the estate, without much focus placed on the future beneficiaries, while the Wheless
court may have made a future-looking identity of interest between the estate and the
beneficiaries who would ultimately inherit the estate. This fundamental difference in
how to view administration of the estate may well underlie a number of irreconcilable
opinions and positions in regard to whether to characterize expenses as deductible administration expenses or as non-deductible expenses inuring to the (generally disallowed)
benefit of the beneficiaries. See supra note 92 (discussion of Rev. Rul. 77-461, 1977-2
C.B. 324). See also supra text accompanying note 16 (discussion of Hibernia Bank). See
also infra note 164 (discussion of Estate of Lasarzig).
117 Estate of Rosen v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-115, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1220 at *21
(2006).
118 Id. at *21-25. In Rosen, the decedent had transferred the bulk of her estate to a
Family Limited Partnership. The Commissioner argued that the decedent retained possession or enjoyment of the property transferred, and that the property was therefore
properly includable in the decedent’s gross estate under § 2036(a)(1). Id. at *1. The FLP
“loaned” the decedent funds to cover medical and daily expenses, which the Commissioner argued were not actually loans, but rather were continuing enjoyment of the transferred property. The court quoted Strangi v. Commissioner, 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2005),
where a transfer to an FLP was similarly deemed not to be a true transfer, and where a
loan from the FLP to the decedent for daily expenses and later to the decedent’s estate
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In Geftman v. Commissioner, an estate borrowed funds from a trust
which had been set up by the decedent’s father and of which the decedent had been the sole beneficiary.119 The court held that to constitute
a bona fide loan for tax purposes, there must have been, at the time of
the transfer, an unconditional obligation for the borrower to repay and
an unconditional intention of the lender to secure repayment. Unless 1)
direct evidence of intent can be shown, or 2) objective characteristics
can be used to infer intent indirectly, the loan is not considered bona
fide.120 The court found neither direct evidence supporting contemporaneous intent,121 nor indirect objective indicia of indebtedness.122
While not discounting the possibility of a bona fide loan between
related parties, even if such loans lacked every formality or characteristic
of true indebtedness, the court nonetheless required numerous objective
factors indicative of a true loan in order to characterize the loan as bona
fide.123 When the transferor and transferee are controlled by the same
parties, the court required heightened scrutiny: an “objective test of economic reality.”124 This is because the formal nature of the transaction
could easily be molded to suit the parties’ wishes, despite outward forfor purposes of paying estate taxes were held to not constitute a bona fide loan. See id. at
*14, discussed supra note 73.
119 Geftman v. Comm’r, 154 F.3d 61, 63-64 (3d Cir. 1998).
120 Id. at 68 (quoting Haag v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 604, 615-16 (1987)). The court listed
examples of objective characteristics: presence of debt instruments, collateral, interest
provisions, repayment schedules or deadlines, book entries recording loan balances or
interest payments, actual repayments, and “any other attributes indicative of an enforceable obligation to repay the sums advanced.” Id. (quoting Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United
States, 398 F.2d 694, 696 (3d Cir. 1968)).
121 Geftman, 154 F.3d at 70. Based on the court’s analysis, it would have been very
difficult after the fact to support a direct finding of contemporaneous intent. A contemporaneous (not after-occurring) and specific declaration of unconditional intent to enter
a bona fide loan subject to unconditional repayment would have been required. See id. at
68-70.
122 Id. at 70. Although there were some repayments made, the purported loan in
question involved no debt instrument or other written promise, required neither collateral nor security, did not impose any interest, had no repayment schedule or maturity
date, and involved no book entries. The court discussed Gilbert v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.
60, 65-66 (1980), where even a complete repayment was not sufficient indication of a
bona fide loan because the repayments were made over a long period of time and were
inconsistent with repayment terms or schedules laid out originally. Geftman, 154 F.3d at
71.
123 Id. at 73. The court emphasized that courts have more often than not rejected
loans as not bona fide when between related parties, despite the presence of significant
objective evidence. Id. The court ultimately required a “totality of the objective evidence” standard. Id. at 74.
124 Id. at 75 (quoting Fin Hay Realty Co., 398 F.2d at 696).
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malities.125 The court applied the test by determining whether a bona
fide characterization of the loan would be in accord with the actual effect of the transaction. In practical terms, that is, the court considered
whether a third party lender would have made a loan under similar circumstances. The court determined that no reasonable third party lender
would have made an almost three million dollar loan with no promise to
repay, no assurance that the estate would be in a financial position to
repay, no security, no repayment schedule, and no book entries listing a
balance due.126 The court characterized the relationship between the
estate and the trust as between donor and beneficiary rather than as
between debtor and creditor.127 With no obligation to repay on the part
of the “borrower” and no intent to collect repayment on the part of the
“lender,” the court held the transfer to be a reclamation or conveyance
of assets from the trust back to the estate rather than a bona fide loan,
and therefore held interest payments to be not deductible for lack of a
creation of genuine indebtedness.128
In Estate of Graegin v. Commissioner, the Commissioner argued
that the loan was not a true loan because repayment was tenuous for
three reasons: 1) the borrower (Graegin’s estate) and lender (Graegin
Corporation) were both controlled by the executor (Paul Graegin, the
decedent’s son), 2) the loan was unsecured, and 3) no corporate minutes
approved the loan, indicating it was not negotiated in good faith.129 The
125 Id. In the course of discussing its economic reality test, the court considered that
“borrowing” from trusts was only possible because the estate had funded these trusts four
months before, indicating that the transactions were taken solely to generate deductible
interest payments. Id. The court also considered that the estate exercised control over
the trusts and held the ability to reassert control over all trust assets at any time. Id. at
75-76.
126 On a similar set of facts, in Estate of Black v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. 340 (2009),
the court pointed out that at the time of the loan, it was “inconceivable” that the borrower would be able to pay back the lender from liquid assets. (The comment was in
dicta; the court there did not need to reach a determination on the bona fide loan issue).
Id. at 385.
127 Geftman v. Comm’r, 154 F.3d 61, 76 (3d Cir. 1998).
128 Id. The court did recognize, however, that related parties can make bona fide
loans under circumstances that differ from those of the market, and that the loan need
not be profitable to the lender to be bona fide. It distinguished the instant case, however,
because in Geftman the lender not only made no profit, but incurred significant cost and
risk to make the loan without even an expectation that the principal would be repaid.
(Though there were four irregular payments made in partial reimbursement of principal.)
Id. The terms of the transfer in Geftman were further distinguishable from the terms of
another loan made by the same trust to another related party which was secured by a
home mortgage, included a written agreement to repay the loan on a certain schedule
and at a specified interest rate. Id. at 77.
129 Estate of Graegin v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1988-477, 56 T.C.M. 387, 390-91
(1988).
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court rejected all three of these reasons and found the indebtedness to
be genuine and the future interest payments immediately deductible.130
The court applied a facts and circumstances test to determine if a loan is
bona fide: the loan exists if the repayment was actually contemplated by
the borrower and lender.131 While recognizing the potential for abuse
in Graegin-like arrangements, the court found Paul Graegin’s testimony
with regard to his intent to repay the note credible.132 Furthermore,
there was an outside minority shareholder of Graegin Corporation, who
could be expected to complain if the note was not paid in a timely fashion.133 The court also emphasized that the interest rate (fixed at 15%)
and term of the loan were not unreasonable.134 The court was bothered
that the loan was repayable in a single balloon payment of principal and
interest at the end of the term, but nevertheless found this reasonable
because of the decedent’s post-mortem asset arrangements.135 The court
also noted that several parties agreed to the loan: the bank, the guardian ad litem for the minor heirs, and the local court having jurisdiction
over the estate.136
130

Id. at 391. Significantly, the immediate deduction allowed was for the full
amount, and not for a discounted present value of the future balloon payment. Jeffrey N.
Pennell, Graegin Interest Expense Deduction, 57-19 S. CAL. ANN. INST. ON MAJOR TAX
PLAN. § P-1906.1 (2005). This, despite the fact that the projected interest payments were
about $460,000 and the loan itself was for only about $204,000. Because the value of
property in the estate subject to claims at the date of death exceeded the administration
expenses including the full value of the interest expense, the entire interest expense was
allowed as a deduction, and not controlled by § 2053(c)(2). Graegin, T.C. Memo. 1988477, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) at 391.
131 Id. at 391.
132 Id. at 390-91. The court acknowledged that when debtor and creditor have an
“identity of interest,” loans require close scrutiny, but held that such identity of interest
was not fatal to the loan characterization. Id. Paul Graegin was simultaneously the son
of the decedent, a co-trustee of his deceased father’s trust (assets of the estate), co-executor of the will, and president and member of the board of directors of the closely held
business which made the loan. Mark K. Brown, Graegin Notes and Family Limited Partnerships, FLA. B. BULL. Feb. 2006, Tax Sec. 1, 5.
133 Graegin, T.C. Memo. 1988-477, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) at 390. As for the Commissioner’s concern at the lack of corporate minutes, the court noted that closely held corporations often act informally without recording decisions. Id. See Levenson & Klein, Inc.
v. Comm’r, 67 T.C. 694, 714 (1977).
134 Graegin, T.C. Memo. 1988-477, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) at 391. The court found the
rate reasonable even though it was based on the prime short term obligation interest rate,
whereas the term of the loan was 15 years.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 391. The Commissioner further argued that because there was “no reasonable certainty that the interest will be paid,” the loan failed under (then) Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2053-1(b)(3) (requiring that 1) the amount of the estimated expense be ascertainable
with reasonable certainty, and 2) that it will be paid). See infra the discussion of the
reasonably ascertainable requirement beginning at the text accompanying note 175. The
court held that the amount of interest on this note was neither vague nor uncertain, but
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was capable of calculation and reasonably certain because it could not be prepaid, and
that the testimony of the executor as to his intent to repay the loan was credible. Estate
of Graegin v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1988-477, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 387, 391 (1988). The
court noted that “[n]othing in life (but death) is certain.” Id. See also PLR 200449031
(Dec. 3, 2004) (allowing interest deduction on loan necessary for the administration for
the estate when loan was from a bank and collateral was comprised of the estate’s illiquid
assets: stock in a closely held corporation). It is interesting that the court was “disturbed” by the note’s ban on prepayments in its bona fide credibility analysis, but found
it salutary in its estimable certainty analysis. Nevertheless, the prohibition on early prepayment was vital to make the interest expense calculable with reasonable certainty
under (then) Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(3). See Pennell, supra note 130, § P-1906.1; Rev.
Rul. 84-75, 1984-1 C.B. 193; PLR 200020011 (May 19, 2000); PLR 199952039 (Dec. 29,
1999); PLR 199903038 (Jan. 22, 1999) (allowing § 2053 deductions for fixed and determinable interest where the loan could not be prepaid and the estate established the necessity of the loan to the administration of the estate); TAM 8450003 (Aug. 17, 1984).
But see TAM 200513028 (Apr. 1, 2005). There the I.R.S. disallowed a Graegin-type
loan from a Family Limited Partnership to an estate on the grounds that the loan was not
a reasonable and actual expense, but rather was unnecessary to the administration of the
estate, arguing that the partnership could be collapsed and its underlying assets sold without restriction because 1) over half the assets of the partnership were liquid or marketable, and though the estate could not force a distribution from the partnership to pay
estate taxes (estate was functionally liquid), 2) the estate owned 99% of the partnership,
meaning that the same parties were “sitting on both sides of the table,” making the assets
readily available for the payment of estate taxes and any transfer of funds “circular,” and
interest payments of no economic consequence to the parties (bona fide loan test failed),
3) the partnership was not engaged in any active business, 4) the loan was entered into
solely to obtain an up-front estate tax deduction for interest expenses, and was thus not
necessarily incurred because it did not protect the value of illiquid assets (bona fide loan
test failed), 5) repayment was uncertain (in the opinion of the Service) (certainty of repayment test failed), and 6) the decedent had transferred 90% of his assets to the partnership (bona fide sale test failed). This technical advice memorandum suggests by
implication that loans are more likely to survive I.R.S. scrutiny if there is 1) illiquidity in
the estate, legitimately caused, 2) non-identity of economic interests (and real economic
effect) among the parties, 3) active business or at least a legitimate business purpose for
the FLP, 4) a purpose for the loan other than estate tax administration expense deductions, 5) greater certainty of repayment (assisted by non-identity of parties), and 6) independence of the FLP from the decedent (that is, a bona fide sale under § 2036). Even
safer (though perhaps not as economically advantageous), would be if the loan is taken
from a third party, such as a bank, rather than from an FLP. Advantages of taking a loan
from a bank over an FLP include obviating the need for the FLP to sell assets to make
the loan (with possible associated capital gains taxes), and the use of outside money, as
long as the interest rate is reasonable. Brown, supra note 132, at 6. For analysis, see also
Jason R. Flaherty, Recent Developments in Estate and Inheritance Tax, TEX. TAX LAW.
14, 16 (2005). See also Brown, supra note 132, at 5. For an interesting approach to the
identity of interest issue, see Klein v. Hughes, No. A103940, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 3788 (Apr. 20, 2004) (allowing a deduction where a tax attorney created his own
LLC, which took a loan from the decedent and then lent to the decedent’s trust at a
greater rate of interest.)
Because the values of balloon payments on Graegin notes are “reasonably ascertainable,” the new 2009 regulations do not adversely affect their effectiveness. Akers, supra
note 92. See infra text accompanying notes 194-201.
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If a Family Limited Partnership makes distributions to pay estate
taxes outright, the I.R.S. may view that transaction as circumstantial evidence of an implied agreement between the decedent and the FLP,
meaning that the decedent’s original illiquidity-causing transfer to the
FLP is suspect under § 2036.137 Graegin-type notes have been suggested
as a way of allaying this suspicion because the FLP will receive adequate
and full consideration, in the form of interest payments, for the loan.138
In response to the holding in Graegin, the Service issued a litigation
guideline memorandum, indicating that though Graegin notes would
have to be allowed, estates could nevertheless expect a challenge if the
bona fide nature of the debt is in question, if the interest liability is not
certain or reasonably estimable, or if the borrowing is arguably not necessary – in other words, if the loan does not accord with the other requirements for deductibility reified in the case law.139
The recent 2009 Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-1(b)(2)(i) specifies
that only bona fide expenses and claims are permitted to be deducted,
and that transfers which are essentially donative in nature (that is, “a
mere cloak for a gift or bequest”) are not deductible.140 Section
20.2053-1(b)(2)(ii) lists three types of relationships which the Service
will single out for scrutiny in this area, including family members of the
decedent, related entities, and beneficiaries. The new regulation also
enumerates factors which are indicative, but not necessarily determinative, of a bona fide expense or claim.141 The regulations also provide
137

Strangi v. Comm’r, 417 F.3d 468, 469 (5th Cir. 2005).
Brown, supra note 132, at 5. Brown advised caution in using this strategy, however, because if the FLP is determined to lack business purpose, (also, incidentally for the
purposes of this discussion, meaning that the decedent’s gifts to the FLP would not be
given a discounted value), the I.R.S. might use that determination as evidence that the
note was unnecessary and not bona fide. Id. at 6. See also Rico, Part 1, supra note 2, at
53; (warning that the Service may consider a Graegin note from an FLP to be evidence of
retained enjoyment under § 2036). Another advantage of the balloon payment approach
is the income tax deferral to the lender, who does not receive interest payment until the
end of the loan term. However, if the FLP must sell assets immediately to make the loan,
capital gains tax could be triggered, as mentioned supra at note 136. Brown, supra note
132, at 6.
139 I.R.S. 1989 Litig. Guideline Mem. TL-65, 1 (Mar. 14, 1989). This litigation guideline memorandum also provides a summary of the case law up until 1989, from the Service’s point of view. Lisa M. Rico points out that using Graegin notes carries the risk of
the Service denying the deduction, in which case the interest expense must still be paid
without the advantage of the deduction under § 2053(a)(2). Rico, Part 1, supra note 2, at
53.
140 An explicit exception to this rule is for § 2055 charitable bequests.
141 Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(2)(ii)(A-E). The factors include the following: (A)
the transaction was in the ordinary course of business, was negotiated at arm’s length,
and has no donative intent; (B) the claim or expense is unrelated to an expected inheritance or claim; (C) the expense or claim was pursuant to an agreement substantiated by
138
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that for claims which were founded on a promise or agreement, the
“promise or agreement must have been bargained for at arm’s length
and the price must have been an adequate and full equivalent reducible
to money value.”142
F. Keeping Estate Open for an Unduly and Unnecessarily Long
Time
If an estate is kept open longer than necessary, then expenses incurred during the unnecessary excess time are by definition unnecessary
and therefore non-deductible. In the realm of loans taken out to pay
estate taxes, it is important to consider how long the estate will have to
be kept open. Some interest expenses are not deductible up front, and
the executors must wait to deduct them until they are actually incurred,
possibly years or decades later.143 Fortunately for estates which take
loans to pay estate taxes, courts have held that keeping the estate open
until the loan is repaid does not constitute holding the estate open for an
unnecessarily long time, and therefore interest expenses incurred during
the entire term of the loan are all deductible, even as they are
accrued.144
The most quoted case involving keeping an estate open for an unduly and unnecessarily long time is Hibernia Bank v. United States. In
Hibernia Bank, the executors held an estate open for seven years in order to sell a mansion in the estate for the benefit and convenience of the
beneficiaries. The court found that the estate was kept open longer than
necessary, and that interest expenses incurred when the estate need not
have been kept open were by definition not necessary administration
expenses, and therefore were not deductible.145
contemporary evidence; (D) performance on the agreement can be substantiated; and
(E) all payments made were reported by both parties for Federal income tax and employment tax purposes. The definitions section (Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(2)(iii)) describes
precisely which “family members,” “beneficiaries,” and “related entities” are to be considered for the special scrutiny. Consider also I.R.S. 1989 Litig. Guideline Mem. TL-65, 1
n. 1 (suggesting that § 267’s limitations on the deductibility of loan interest between related parties may also apply to interest deductions on an estate’s income tax return).
142 Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4(d)(5). Prior regulations required such promises or agreements to be “bona fide and in exchange for adequate and full consideration.” The new
regulation appears to be less permissive because of the arm’s length factor which it specifies. See Akers, supra note 92.
143 See discussion infra beginning at text accompanying note 175.
144 If the estate is closed, however, then a statute of limitations may bar future claims
for refunds based on future interest expense deductions. The statute of limitations issue
is discussed infra in the context of property not subject to claims at note 184.
145 Hibernia Bank v. United States, 581 F.2d 741, 747 (9th Cir. 1978). Antonucci and
Whitman point out the executors should remember that they bear personal liability for
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In McKee v. Commissioner, the court distinguished Hibernia
Bank.146 Citing to Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-3(d)(1), which provides that “expenses for caring and preserving property will not be allowed ‘for a longer period than the executor is reasonably required to
retain the property,’” the court held that unlike in Hibernia Bank,
where the estate was unnecessarily kept open to sell a mansion for the
convenience of the beneficiaries, here the estate was kept open through
taking a loan because of liquidity issues inhering in the estate, which the
court considered necessary.147
Similarly, in Estate of Sturgis v. Commissioner, the court held that,
contrary to the Commissioner’s argument that an estate had been kept
open much longer than necessary, thereby making the loans and interest
payments made during the excess period unnecessary and non-deductible, it is reasonable to keep an estate open for either of two reasons.148
Firstly, estates may be reasonably kept open because of litigation, including litigation about estate taxes.149 Secondly, the estate may be reasonably kept open to repay a loan, (including loans to pay estate taxes),
if the loan was reasonable when drawn.150
III. WAS

THE

EXPENSE “ACTUALLY” INCURRED?

If an expense is not “actually” incurred, it is not deductible under
Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-3(a). The case law discusses what is
meant by “actually” incurred, largely through identifying what does not
meet the requirement. Three types of situations have been identified as
not actually incurring a debt: 1) when the estate is not the entity which
outstanding Federal estate tax until it is paid in full. Antonucci & Whitman, supra note
18, at 112.
146 McKee v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-362, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 324, 331 (1996).
147 Id. Drawing on the language of Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(d)(1), the Ballance v.
United States court stated in dicta that interest expense would not be allowable as a deduction if it was only incurred because of a failure on the part of the executor to pay a
claim “as promptly as reasonably possible.” 347 F.2d 419, 423 (7th Cir. 1965).
148 Estate of Sturgis v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1987-415, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 221 (1987).
149 Id. In Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-325, 76 T.C.M.
(CCH) 426 (1998), the court held that the administration of the estate was not unduly
prolonged because of interest expenses. The court distinguished from Hibernia Bank v.
United States, 581 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1978). Whereas in Hibernia Bank there was no
reason to keep the estate open other than selling the mansion, in Thompson there was, at
the least, a particular tax eligibility dispute requiring the estate to remain open. Thompson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-325, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 426, 434 (1998).
150 Sturgis, T.C. Memo. 1987-415, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 221. In Estate of Bailly v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 949 (1983) (supplemental opinion), the court opted to keep the estate
open until the last § 6166 installment payment was made in order to allow all interest
payments to be made and deducted as they accrued.
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incurs the loan,151 2) when the estate overpays interest expenses which it
retroactively never paid and therefore never incurred in the first
place,152 and 3) when it is unclear whether or how much interest will be
paid, meaning that the expense may never “actually” be incurred.153
A. When Estate Not the True Borrower
In Rupert v. United States, the majority of the value of the decedent’s gross estate consisted of the present value of a stream of future
(state lottery) payments, to be paid out over almost twenty years.154
The decedent had established a trust into which lottery payments would
be deposited. The trust (and not the estate per se), took a loan from a
bank to pay the majority of the estate taxes. The vast majority of the
lottery payments had not yet been paid, and the estate tax liabilities of
the estate were greater than the assets then currently in the estate. The
trust was the sole party responsible for repaying the loan. The Commissioner argued that the estate did not actually incur the loan because the
trust was the borrower, and not the estate.155 The court rejected this
argument, stating that because the trust was part of the gross estate, it
was obligated to pay its portion of estate taxes as well.156 Furthermore,
the trust gave the proceeds of the loan to the estate to pay the estate’s
estate taxes. Therefore, the court concluded, the trust had a “sufficient
nexus” to the estate to consider the interest expenses actually incurred
by the estate.157
The court in Estate of Lasarzig v. Commissioner determined that
interest expenses on a loan taken to pay estate taxes were not deductible because the loan was not actually incurred by the estate.158 The
court read § 20.2053-3(a)’s “actually incurred” requirement in conjunction with Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-8(b), which explains further
that expenses incurred in administering property “not subject to claims”
(which the expenses in Lasarzig were taken to be), are only deductible if
those expenses were “occasioned by the decedent’s death and incurred
in settling the decedent’s interest in the property or vesting good title to
the property in the beneficiaries.”159 If expenses do not fall under that
151 See Rupert v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 2d 421 (M.D. Pa. 2004); Estate of
Lasarzig v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-307, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 448 (1999).
152 See Succession of Helis v. United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 544 (2003).
153 See Estate of Bailly v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 246 (1983).
154 Rupert, 358 F. Supp. at 422.
155 Id. at 423.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 423-24.
158 Estate of Lasarzig v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-307, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 448
(1999).
159 See discussion of property subject and not subject to claims infra at note 184.
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description, but were “incurred on behalf of the transferees,” they cannot be deducted.160 The court in Lasarzig explained this section of the
regulations to mean that loan proceeds used to pay estate taxes which
were not “attributable” to the estate itself could not generate deductible
interest expenses.161 In Lasarzig, the loan was taken not by the estate,
but by a QTIP trust which was not subject to the probate of the estate.
The court observed that this trust (and therefore the assets securing the
loan), which had already been distributed to the transferees, were “unrelated” to the estate or to the assets of the estate.162 That the decision to
take a loan instead of selling illiquid property was made by the beneficiaries’ trusts – and not by the estate itself – because of the beneficiaries’
dissatisfaction with market conditions, made the loan not a necessity of
the estate’s administration, but rather a personal decision of the
beneficiaries.163
In the course of its discussion, the Lasarzig court discussed the signature characteristic which indicates sufficient connection to the estate:
timing. Interest expenses incurred during the administration of the estate or before resolution of a tax controversy are deductible.164 In contrast, by the time the loan was taken by the beneficiaries in Lasarzig, the
160

Lasarzig, T.C. Memo. 1999-307, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 448 at *3.
Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at *7, *8. The court held this despite the estate’s argument that the loan was
intended, according to the language of Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-8(b), to “vest good title in
the beneficiaries” by enabling the payment of estate taxes and thus removing a lien
placed by the I.R.S. on the beneficiaries’ (already distributed) property. The estate’s
arguments that the value of the property, if sold, would have been more than double the
outstanding estate tax due (and was even expected to increase in value), and that the
estate would have had to sell fractional shares at a discount, were also unavailing because
the court held that the property was unrelated to the estate. Id. at *10, *11. The court’s
analysis is similar to that in Hibernia Bank v. United States, 581 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1978),
except that the analysis is located within the actuality requirement rather than the necessity requirement. See Hibernia Bank discussed supra at note 16.
164 Estate of Lasarzig v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-307, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 448 at *5
(1999). This characteristic explains part of why some estates have sought a deferral of
final judgment in tax controversies until the term of the loan which the estate took to pay
estate taxes is complete. The Lasarzig estate sought to keep the estate open for up to 20
years after the resolution of all issues for this reason; the court declined. Another reason
the Lasarzig estate argued to keep the estate open was because the interest on the loan
was variable, and keeping the estate open would have enabled the estate to satisfy the
certainty requirement for its interest expenses as they were accrued and paid (see infra
Section III), or to deduct a present value estimate of the interest. Id. at *5 n.5. The court
is permitted to reopen § 6161 and § 6166 cases to consider post-decision interest issues.
§ 7481(d). The court acknowledged that private lender situations could be analogous to
constructive government lender situations, but distinguished here because the estate was
not a party to the loan. Lasarzig, T.C. Memo. 1999-307, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 448 at *5.
Ultimately, because of this key distinction, the court left the question of unduly long
161
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estate no longer had any assets in it to administer or distribute.165 Another characteristic which the court emphasized is acting in the capacity
of an executor rather than a beneficiary. Incurring expenses as an executor is characteristic of loans taken by the estate, whereas here the expenses were incurred by parties acting as beneficiaries.166 A further
corollary is that when an estate is the entity doing the borrowing it is
doing so because the estate lacks liquidity.167 Though the court acknowledged that the QTIP trust had a “nexus” to the estate because the
value of the assets in it were part of the gross estate and the loan was to
pay the QTIP’s share of estate taxes, the trusts, having already been
distributed, were “personal instrumentalities” which borrowed, far removing them from the actual administration of the estate.168
B. When Estate Overpays and Is Refunded Its Interest Expense
In Succession of Helis v. United States, the court dealt with a constructive loan from the government under a § 6166 estate tax installment
plan.169 Because the value of the gross estate was cumulatively reduced
by the interest expense deductions as they accrued, the estate paid the
government more interest than necessary on its estate taxes. The government refunded that interest overpayment to the estate. The issue
was whether the interest found to be unnecessarily incurred should be
nevertheless deductible, or whether that portion of interest which was
overpaid should not be treated as deductible.170 The court held that the
delays open. Id. at *8; See also Hibernia Bank, 581 F.2d 741, discussed supra at notes 16
and 30.
165 Lasarzig, T.C. Memo. 1999-307, at *4. Although the loan was taken to pay the
QTIP’s “share” of the estate tax of the estate, the court still found the timing of events
more persuasive. Id. at *8. Robert E. Madden and Lisa H.R. Hayes consider the distribution of assets to the beneficiaries and otherwise settling the estate to have been the
estate’s and trustee’s most significant mistake. Robert E. Madden et al., Estate Not Allowed Interest Deduction, 27 EST. PLAN. 32, 34 (Jan. 2000).
The Lasarzig court also distinguished § 6161 deferrals, saying that this case involves
interest deductions after payment of the estate tax, not during its deferral. Here, furthermore, the estate tax liability was no longer in dispute. Lasarzig, T.C. Memo. 1999-307, 78
T.C.M. (CCH) 448 at *4. See discussion of Estate of Bahr v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 74
(1977), supra note 17.
166 Id. The court distinguished Estate of Huntington v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A, 698
(1937). See supra note 3.
167 Lasarzig, T.C. Memo. 1999-307, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 448 at *7. The court distinguished from Estate of Todd v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 288 (1971). See supra text accompanying notes 7-15.
168 Lasarzig, T.C. Memo. 1999-307, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 448 at *7.
169 Succession of Helis v. United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 544 (2003).
170 Id. This issue could be relevant to any case where the government argues that the
estate borrowed more than necessary in light of the estate tax due, and therefore the
estate benefited from a larger interest deduction than that to which it was entitled. Cf.
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disputed interest expense was never “actually” incurred (that is, it was
never actually paid).171 Because the interest which was overpaid was, in
hindsight, never actually due, and because it was refunded, it was never
actually incurred, and therefore the disputed expense was not
deductible.172
C. When Interest Amount Uncertain When Return Filed
Courts have struggled with whether interest payable in the future
which is uncertain (as to whether it will be paid) or unascertainable (in
value) when the estate tax return is filed, is deductible immediately on
Estate of Gilman v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-286, 86 T.C.M. (RIA) 1814, 1822, 1824
(2004), supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text (providing a similar analysis within the
necessity requirement).
171 Helis, 56 Fed. Cl. at 549.
172 Id. at 548. The court analogized to Estate of O’Daniel v. United States, 6 F.3d 321
(5th Cir. 1993), where the court similarly held that the portion of interest which was
overpaid (and refunded to the estate) on a deficiency claim was never “actually” incurred, and was therefore not deductible.
The court also considered whether the refunded interest should be treated as income
to the estate, which would have been income taxable rather than estate taxable (and
possibly estate tax deductible). The interest expense could have originally been deducted
either from income of the estate or as an administrative expense of the estate. See
§ 642(g); Treas. Reg. § 1.642(g)-2 (allowing estates to divide their allowable deductions
between income tax and estate tax within a single taxable year or among taxable years
however they wish as long as there is no duplication). The court made much of a distinction made by the O’Daniel court between income tax treatment, which is sealed with the
close of each tax year, and estate tax treatment, which centers on the event of death and
is open-ended until the estate closes. The court formulated a rule that “[s]o long as the
recovery or gain, in this case the cancellation of interest, is more properly attributable to
the creation of the estate, as opposed to subsequent income of the estate, it is appropriate
to fold the recovery into the estate tax calculation. That is particularly so when the estate
elected to take the deduction under estate rather than income tax laws.” Helis, 56 Fed.
Cl. at 548. Because the estate was still open at the time of judgment, the refunded interest could be netted against the original overpayment for a net estate tax deduction on
that overpayment of zero. Correspondingly, the value of the estate after the refund was
equal to what it would have been without the overpayment having ever occurred (as was,
in fact, the case in Helis). For a discussion of inconsistencies between deficiency claims
and refund claims as a result of the court’s analysis, as well as possible third party lender
similarities, see id. at 549. There are a number of considerations which executors should
have in mind when deciding whether to use an income tax deduction or an estate tax
deduction, including differences in tax rates, possible conflicts of interest between beneficiaries (which may be ameliorated by language in the testamentary documents), the tax
year time limitation which exists for income taxes but not for estate taxes, and, of course,
the amount of income of the estate against which a deduction would be utilizable.
Antonucci & Whitman, supra note 18, at 123-25; 2 MATHEW BENDER & CO., Trust Administration and Taxation, § 39.07, 39.07(2)(f) (2010). See also Estate of Street v.
Comm’r, 974 F.2d 723, 729 (6th Cir. 1992); Rev. Rul. 70-361, 1970-2 C.B. 133. For a
discussion of beneficiaries taking deductions for interest expenses of the estate personally, see BENDER, supra, § 39.07(5).
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the estate tax return, or is deductible only as it accrues and is actually
incurred and paid.173 The question is not black and white; courts have
also had to deal with exactly how certain or ascertainable a future interest payment must be in order to be deductible immediately on the estate
tax return as an “actually” incurred expense.174 Courts will weigh the
characteristics of the loan in question in order to decide if the interest
which is (or may be) incurred is sufficiently fixed and ascertainable.175
In Estate of Bailly v. Commissioner, the estate elected a deferred
estate tax payment plan, (and thus a constructive loan from the government), under § 6166 for Federal estate taxes and under a similar State
statute for State inheritance taxes.176 Under the plans, the estate would
make estate tax payments (including both principal and interest) over a
ten year period.177 The estate sought a deduction based on an estimate
of the cumulative interest which would be paid over the ten years.178
The court applied the language of Treasury Regulation § 20.20531(b)(3), which requires claims for deductions, even if their exact amount
is not yet known, to be “ascertainable with reasonable certainty, and will
be paid,” and disallows deductions on the basis of a “vague or uncertain
estimate.”179 The court held that the estimate of interest expenses was
173

See, e.g., Estate of Bailly v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 246, 249 (1983).
See, e.g., id.
175 This issue is somewhat similar to the question of whether a loan is bona fide,
discussed supra beginning at text accompanying note 117. The facts and circumstances
analysis which courts apply to the loan has some similarities, and the question of certainty
has a definite bearing on whether a loan is bona fide, and vice versa. There are significant differences, however. For instance, a loan might not have a reasonably ascertainable
value of future interest payments, but be bona fide nonetheless. Alternatively, the value
of the future interest payments may be reasonably certain, but the loan may not be bona
fide for other reasons. For instance, Rev. Rul. 84-25, 1984-1 C.B. 191 held that a promissory note, though enforceable against the estate, was really a disguised gift and not a
bona fide and deductible loan because it was not given for adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth. What is at stake is also different. If the loan is bona
fide, interest on the loan will be deductible, even if not immediately. If a loan is not bona
fide, interest expenses will never be deductible, as the expense was by definition never
actually incurred.
176 FLA. STAT. § 198.18(2) (2012).
177 Note that deductions for interest paid under a § 6166 deferral plan are no longer
possible after the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
178 The estate wanted this estimated interest deduction because it was concerned that
if the estate would have to file a return accounting for the amount of interest expense for
each year as the interest accrued or claim a refund for overpayments for earlier years, the
estate would be barred by the statute of limitations. Bailly, 81 T.C. at 249. See infra note
184.
179 Estate of Bailly v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 246, 250 (1983). The Bailly court formulated
this Regulation section as the rule. The current version of this Regulation section now
appears at § 20.2053-1(d)(4).
174
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neither reasonably certain nor certain to be paid.180 It was not reasonably certain because the interest rate for § 6166 deferral plans is tied to
semi-annual adjustments under § 6621(b), and in the five years prior to
the decision, the rate had fluctuated from as low as 6% to as high as
20%.181 The same reasoning held true for the interest expenses related
to the deferral taken by the estate to pay State inheritance taxes, the
rates for which had fluctuated from 6% to 12% over a similar period.182
It was also uncertain that the interest on the Federal estate tax interest
would actually be paid because § 6166(g) allows the estate to prepay
estate tax still owing, either in whole or in part, in which case the future
interest expense projected on the estate tax return would never be incurred. Furthermore, the estate could be forced, under certain circumstances, to prepay involuntarily.183 The court held, therefore, that
interest could only be deducted as it accrued.184
180

Bailly, 81 T.C. at 251.
Id. at 249, 251-52. The court distinguished Bailly, where the rate fluctuated under
§ 6621, from Estate of Bahr v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 74 (1977) (discussed supra note 17),
where the rate did not fluctuate because in the early 1970s, § 6601 did not require periodic adjustment of the interest rate. Bailly, 81 T.C. at 250.
182 Id. at 253.
183 Id. at 251. Under § 6166(g)(1)(A), estate tax liability which is deferred is payable
in full upon notice and demand in the event that 50 percent of the interest which qualified for the business was sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of, or under
§ 6166(g)(3)(A) in the event that the estate failed to make a principal or interest payment
within six months of when it was due.
184 Bailly, 81 T.C. at 251. The court listed two published procedures for obtaining
deductions as interest accrues each year: Rev. Rul. 80-250, 1980-2 C.B. 278 and Rev.
Proc. 81-27, 1981-2 C.B. 548. The estate can file supplemental estate tax returns each
year to recalculate the reduced amount of tax due after the payment of administration
expenses. But see Estate of Spillar v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1985-529, 50 T.C.M. (CCH)
1285, 1289 (1985) (holding that this procedure could not be used after an entry of decision by the court because entries of decision preclude later filing of claims for a refund
under § 6512(a). There, the court held that, especially considering the large number of
installment payments yet to be made, and hence the significant amount of administration
expense deductions for interest payments which stood to be lost, the entry of decision
would be postponed until the last payment was due or paid, whichever was earlier).
In a supplemental opinion, the Bailly court decided that the estate’s statute of limitations concern (see supra note 178) was legitimate. Estate of Bailly v. Comm’r, 81 T.C.
949, 954 (1983). The court therefore deferred final judgment until the end of the deferment so that the estate could request any necessary modifications as interest was accrued,
paid, and deducted. The court expressed concern for its own inconvenience and administration expenses if similar cases were also required to be kept open, and requested a
Congressional intervention. Id. To this author’s knowledge, that request was unavailing.
See also Axtel v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 795 (D. Wyo. 1995). In Axtel, the estate
originally elected a § 6166 deferral, but after several years took a private loan to pay the
rest of the estate tax due. Under § 6511, the estate is only entitled to make a claim for a
refund within the later of two years after the tax was paid, or three years after the return
is filed. When the estate was using a § 6166 deferral, § 6511 did not present a problem
181
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because the tax was paid, with interest, in installments, and so the estate could file for
refunds as the interest was paid. When the estate switched to a private loan, however, it
ran into problems with § 6511, because the interest on the private loan would not be fully
paid until well after two years after the payment of the estate tax in full, (and the amount
of the interest was not reasonably ascertainable). The estate argued that such a different
treatment amounted to a violation of the equal protection element of the due process
requirement of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The court held
that it was not a constitutional violation because there was no hostile or oppressive discrimination against a particular person or class of persons, and the statute of limitations
had a rational basis (imposing a time limit on claims for purposes of finality and closure)
and constituted notice. Axtel, 860 F. Supp. at 802. As stated above, Rev. Rul. 80-250,
1980-2 C.B. 278 and Rev. Proc. 81-27, 1981-2 C.B. 548 address how to deal with this
problem.
As noted, interest only being deductible as it accrues presents obvious problems if a
time bar applies. In this connection, it is worthwhile to consider § 2053(b), which controls expenses incurred in administering property not subject to claims, and which has a
firm period of limitation for which the published procedures cited supra would not help.
Section 2053(a) deals exclusively with expenses incurred in administering property subject to claims. Section 2053(b) controls expenses incurred in administering property not
subject to claims. Though expenses incurred in administering property subject to claims
need not be paid within a certain amount of time, expenses for administering property
not subject to claims (but which is included in the gross estate), must be paid by the
§ 6501 time limit, which is three years after the date on which the return is filed.
§ 6501(a). (By contrast, for property subject to claims, expenses are still deductible after
the filing due date for the estate tax return, though only for amounts not in excess of the
value of the probate estate at the time of the decedent’s death. § 2053(c)(2).) This timing difference is the most significant practical ramification of whether property is subject
or not subject to claims. The question of how to define what property is or is not subject
to claims is discussed in a 2010 case, Keller v. United States, No. V-02-62, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 95500 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2010). In Keller, the Commissioner argued that under
§ 2053(b), any interest payments after August 14, 2004, that is, three years after the estate
tax return was filed, were time barred from being deductible. Id. at *4, *8. Section
2053(b) says that, subject to certain limitations, for “other administration expenses,” deductions from the taxable estate are allowed for “amounts representing expenses incurred in administering property not subject to claims which is included in the gross
estate to the same extent such amounts would be allowable as a deduction under subsection (a) if such property were subject to claims, and such amounts are paid before the
expiration of the period of limitation for assessment provided in section 6501.” Section
2053(c)(2) limits the deductions allowable under § 2053(a) and defines “property subject
to claims:” “In the case of amounts described in subsection (a), there shall be disallowed
the amount by which the deductions specified therein exceed the value, at the time of the
decedent’s death, of property subject to claims, except to the extent that such deductions
represent amounts paid before the date prescribed for the filing of the estate tax return.
For purposes of this section, the term “property subject to claims” means property includible in the gross estate of the decedent which, or the avails of which, would under the
applicable law, bear the burden of the payment of such deductions in the final adjustment
and settlement of the estate, except that the value of the property shall be reduced by the
amount of the deduction under section 2054 attributable to such property.” The estate
argued that § 2053(b) does not apply in Keller, and that § 2053(a) controls instead. Keller, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95500, at *10.
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Two years later in Estate of Spillar,185 which the court characterized
as an identical fact pattern to Estate of Bailly, there were two types of
interest in addition to the State inheritance tax interest and § 6166 Federal estate tax interest on installment payments considered in Bailly: 1)
§ 6161 interest on installment payments, and 2) interest on loans from a
bank to pay estate taxes and other administration expenses.186 The
court held that all of the interest was deductible under § 2053,187 but
that, as in Bailly, a deduction which does not meet the two pronged test
in what was then Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-1(b)(3), (that is, 1) ascertainable with reasonable certainty and 2) will be paid), is only deductible as it accrues, and not on the original estate tax return as
The Keller court held that for § 2053(a) to control, the deduction must be 1) allowable under state law, and 2) “subject to claims.” Id. If property is not subject to claims,
and no exception applies, then the § 6501 statute of limitations for assessing additional
taxes applies, and interest payments made three years after filing the estate tax claim are
no longer deductible. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-8(a)(2). (The three year rule was described in Burrow Trust v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 1080 (1963) as a requirement for administration expenses to be similar in nature to the administration expenses deductible
under § 2053(a)(2) (as is implied by Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-8(a)(1)), that is, in “winding up
the affairs of the deceased.”) The Commissioner argued that property not subject to
claims should be defined as property which passes outside of the probate estate, as was
the case in Keller. The estate argued that § 2053(c)(2), which defines property subject to
claims for purposes of the § 2053(a) exception, does not distinguish between probate and
non-probate assets. Section 2053(c)(2), the estate argued, instead defines property subject to claims as property which is includible in the gross estate of the decedent which, or
the avails of which, would bear the burden of payment of such deductions in the final
adjustment and settlement of the estate. The court agreed with the estate that the proper
inquiry is not whether property was part of the probate estate. Rather, whether property
is subject to claims depends on whether the property of the estate (or, as in Keller, the
Family Trust), “bore the burden of payment” of the claimed deductions. Keller, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95500, at *12. The will in Keller directed that all legally enforceable
debts and obligations, taxes on the estate, and administration expenses be paid from the
Family Trust or the residual estate. Therefore, because the will so directed, the executors
had a State law fiduciary duty to pay those expenses from that property of the estate.
Therefore, the court found, the estate bore the burden of payment under state law, and
the administrative expense of loan interest payments was therefore deductible even beyond the three year statute of limitations, because the property of the estate was “subject
to claims.” Id. at *12-13, *15. See also Bittker, supra note 16, at 436 n.2. For suggestions
about planning in order to subject property to claims (which would otherwise not be
subject to claims), including a model clause for inclusion in trust documents, see BENDER,
supra note 172, § 39.07(4)(d). See also Estate of Snyder v. United States, No. 97-618 T,
1999 WL 767110 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 20, 1999) (allowing a § 2053(a) deduction for non-probate
property); PLR 9123024 (June 7, 1991) (allowing interest on deduction on interest paid
on deferred estate tax by revocable trust under § 2053(a) because the assets were subject
to claims against the estate under State law).
185 Estate of Spillar v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1985-529, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1288.
186 Id.
187 Id.
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projected interest expenses.188 The interest deductions in Spillar failed
the first prong of this two prong test because the interest rates on the
loans varied significantly (from 7% up to 20% and then back down to
11%) over the course of the loan.189 They failed the second prong because, as in Bailly, under § 6166(g) the closely held ranch in Spillar may
have been wholly or partially sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of,
or the estate could have missed an installment payment, triggering a demand for the estate tax to be accelerated and paid in full, resulting in the
not yet incurred interest payments never being paid.190 Furthermore, an
estate always has the option to accelerate estate tax payments regardless
of a deferral election, also resulting in no interest paid on that portion of
the payments which was accelerated.191 The same was true for the
Texas estate taxes being deferred in Spillar.192 Significantly, the court
held that even if the possibility of prepayment of these liabilities under
the circumstances was remote, it still renders the ultimate payment of
interest uncertain and non-deductible.193
The facts and circumstances distinction made by courts as to interest expense certainty can be seen even more starkly in Estate of Murphy
v. United States.194 In Murphy, the court formulated the rule as follows:
interest expense, if actually and necessarily incurred, is immediately deductible only if its amount is “fixed and ascertainable.”195 There were
two loans taken out by the estate to pay estate taxes. The first loan was
188

Id.
Id. at 1289.
190 Id.
191 Id. The court also noted that the bank loan in Spillar did not have a prepayment
penalty.
192 Id.
193 Id. (quoting Estate of Bailly v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 246, 252 (1983)). See also Rev.
Rul. 84-75, 1984-1 CB 193 (holding that future interest cannot be deducted as an administration expense if the possibility of prepayment (such as early prepayment without a penalty term) makes the estimate of future interest vague and uncertain (even if estate is
illiquid and needed the loan to pay estate taxes). Rather, interest becomes deductible as
it is accrued. If a deduction is sought for interest accrued after estate tax was paid, a
refund claim can be filed). In Rupert v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 2d 421(M.D. Pa.
2004), the executors filed a protective claim for future interest expense deductions, even
though the interest rate was variable after five years and therefore uncertain. Id. at 423.
The protective refund claim had stated that additional refund claims would be submitted
as interest was actually paid. The court held the protective claim to be proper, even
though the actual amount of future interest payments was not yet certain. There would
also have been a statute of limitations issue if the estate were to only make submissions
for refunds for interest expenses as they were incurred. The court ruled that by making a
proper protective claim, the statute of limitations became irrelevant. Id.
194 Estate of Murphy v. United States, No. 07-CV-1013, 2009 WL 3366099 (W.D.
Ark. Oct. 2, 2009).
195 Id. at *25. The decision was decided and filed less than three weeks before the
recent 2009 regulations went into effect. See infra text accompanying notes 199-201.
189
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for a fixed term, at a fixed rate of interest, and did not permit early
payment. Therefore, because the interest expense was “not vague or
uncertain but instead [wa]s capable of calculation,”196 the court held
that it was immediately deductible as a “reasonable and necessary” administration expense.197 The second loan had a floating interest rate
and permitted early repayment. Thus only the interest paid to date on
the second loan was ascertainable, and the court therefore only allowed
a deduction for interest paid to date on the second loan.198
Recent 2009 Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-1(d)(4) provides some
clarity on the certainty requirement question. The regulation provides
that deductions are allowable immediately on the estate tax return even
though the exact amount is not known when the estate tax return is
filed, as long as the amount is “ascertainable with reasonable certainty
and will be paid.”199 If the expenses (either a claim or an administration
expense) are not reasonably ascertainable or will not necessarily be
paid, it is not deductible until it is actually incurred and paid.200 For
196 The court was quoting Estate of Graegin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-477,
56 T.C.M. (CCH) 387, 391 (1988). It is interesting that the court described the certainty
as a threshold inquiry for the necessity requirement, rather than the actually incurred
requirement. Clearly, there is some overlap between the two requirements, e.g. when
loan indebtedness is not actually incurred, expenses paid under that ersatz indebtedness
are not “necessarily incurred” either. See also Geftman v. Commissioner, 154 F.3d 61, 6364 (3rd Cir. 1998), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 119-28.
197 Murphy, 2009 WL 3366099, at *24-25.
198 Id. at *25.
199 Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(d)(4)(i) (emphasis added).
200 Another very important provision of the recent regulations explicitly allows the
filing of a protective refund claim within the period of the statute of limitations. Treas.
Reg. § 20.2053-1(d)(5)(i). See supra notes 94, 184. The protective refund claim must be
relatively specific as to possible outstanding expenses. Section 20.2053-1(d)(5)(ii) provides that reductions in marital or charitable deductions (corresponding to the reduction
in the value of the taxable estate through deductions for claims against the estate or
administration expense deductions), also do not occur until the expenses are either actually paid or become reasonably ascertainable. Subsections 20.2053-4(e)(1) and (2) also
explicitly allow deductions for interest paid on claims which are otherwise deductible
when the amount of interest is either actually paid or becomes reasonably ascertainable,
regardless of whether the interest accrued pre- or post-death. (This has clear applications
for situations similar to that in Estate of Wheless v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 470 (1979),
discussed supra at text accompanying notes 88-95.) Setting the default rule as not allowing a deduction until an expense is paid, as the recent regulations have done, has
raised alarm among a number of commentators. Robert L. Spallina and Laren A.
Galvani are concerned that this new default rule will result in an increased number of
estates which must be kept open until all payments on outstanding obligations of the
estate have been paid. Robert L. Spallina et al., Section 2053 Final Regulations: Continued Uncertainty?, 84 FLA. B. J. 97, 100 (2010). William E. Sigler is concerned that it will
require executors to file protective claims for almost every estate tax return. William E.
Sigler, Fifty Years of Practice Reversed By New Rules on Post-Death Events, 35 MICH.
TAX LAW. 12, 12 (2009). Charles D. Rubin is worried about cash flow problems that will
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non-contingent recurring payments on an enforceable and certain claim
which will be paid, that claim is deemed reasonably ascertainable within
the meaning of Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-1(d)(4).201
result for estates which will have to “pay now” and file for a deduction by refund later.
Rubin, supra note 92, at 139. Lisa K. Johnson is troubled by the additional costs and
burdens to estates because of the obligation to file refund claims year after year, and that
the consequent lack of closure for heirs and executors will prevent them from managing
the estate effectively. Johnson, supra note 95, at 805. Though all of these are potential
problems, it seems to this author that they are not new problems, as has been discussed.
The “new” general rule and exceptions to the rule merely codify the same restrictions on
deductions which the case law and I.R.S. materials have already revealed. For a further
example, see TAM 8011009 (Nov. 29 1979) (holding that interest expenses payable in the
future are deductible only as they accrue, and that such expenses can only be recovered
through filing for a refund). If anything, the added clarity of the recent regulations
should be a help in planning, and not a hindrance. See infra note 201. One policy underlying the recent regulations is to shift the burden of uncertainty onto estates. Rubin,
supra note 92, at 144; Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4(d)(6)(i). Johnson discusses two additional
policies behind the “new” general rule: 1) it prevents executors from reporting an inflated date of death valuation for claims against the estate and then settling those claims
for a lower amount, and 2) it will reduce the number of cases which will need to be
retried in tax court on account of inflated date of death valuations. Johnson, supra note
95, at 802, 804. See Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2051-1, 20.2053-1, -3, -4, -6, -9, -10, 72 Fed.
Reg. 20080 (Apr. 23, 2007) (guidance under § 2053 regarding post-death events).
201 Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4(d)(6)(i). (This is subject to the limitations in Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2053-1, and excludes mortgage-related indebtedness.) This provision of the regulations appears to provide a clear roadmap for pre-death estate planning. The regulations
also allow for the debt to be deemed reasonably ascertainable, measured according to
actuarial principles (that is, with a time-value discount), for recurring payments contingent upon death or remarriage of the claimant. Contingent obligations are otherwise
deemed not reasonably ascertainable. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4(d)(6)(ii). Potential or unmatured claims are not allowed as deductions, though if they might later mature, a claim
for protective refund may be filed, or a claim for refund may be available later if the
statute of limitations has not run. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4(d)(1). Claims actually paid by
the estate are deductible. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4(a)(1)(i). The allowance for deductions
for reasonably ascertainable administration expenses appears in Treas. Reg. § 20.20531(d)(1) (for expenses actually paid), and by reference to § 20.2053-1(d)(4) (for amounts
ascertainable with reasonable certainty which will be paid, including for events occurring
after the decedent’s death). Of course, for amounts which are not reasonably ascertainable (that is, for vague or uncertain estimates, or for contested or contingent claims), taxes
will have to be paid when due without a deduction, and a later refund claim will have to
be filed to receive the deduction for interest payments when they are paid or when they
become reasonably ascertainable. Id. As mentioned in the previous note, this may cause
cash flow problems in some cases. To address part of this problem, the recent regulations
made an exception for claims which are not reasonably ascertainable, but the deduction
for which totals less than $500,000 under specified conditions. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4(c).
Also, importantly, otherwise qualifying claims paid from assets related to the estate and
included the gross estate, but which were not actually retained by the estate are now
deductible under specified circumstances. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4(b). See Estate of
Lasarzig v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-307, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 448 (1999), discussed
supra at text accompanying notes 158-68. This brings gross estate includability into line
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IV. ALLOWABLE BY STATE LAW
The final requirement for deductibility of interest expenses incurred through loans taken to pay estate taxes is that the expenses
themselves must be “allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction, whether
within or without the United States, under which the estate is being administered.”202 This means that interest may only be deducted as an
administrative expense if the executor is permitted to borrow money
and repay loans under relevant State law.203 Significantly, for purposes
of § 2053(a), “the laws of the jurisdiction” are not whether the expense
is allowed as a deduction for purposes of State inheritance taxes. They
are, instead, whether the State would even permit the administrators of
the estate to incur and pay the expense in the first place, that is, whether
it was a “proper” expenditure under local law.204
It is not immediately obvious from § 2053(a) whether the local law
requirement is a threshold provision, implying that Federal law can impose further requirements (as the regulations have always taken as a
given, and as this paper has taken as a given until now), or whether local
law on whether an expense is proper is dispositive as to the Federal
estate tax deductibility of the expense. In a 1973 case, Estate of Park v.
Commissioner, the Sixth Circuit held that through the language of
§ 2053(a), “Congress has committed to the considered judgment of the
states whether a particular expense is allowable as a proper and necessary charge against estate assets.”205 Essentially, this meant that the
I.R.S. regulations concerning the operation of § 2053(a) and definitions
of allowable administration expenses were moot because administration
expense determinations had been given over to the states entirely. In a
1997 case, Estate of Millikin,206 the Sixth Circuit en banc overruled their
1973 decision. In Millikin, the court came into line with other circuits’
opinions207 and, through a reanalysis of the cases upon which Estate of
with deductibility. See also Dodge, supra note 16, at 663-69. See generally Rubin, supra
note 92; Akers, supra note 92.
202 § 2053(a).
203 Estate of Murphy v. United States, No. 07-CV-1013, 2009 WL 3366099 (W.D.
Ark. Oct. 2, 2009).
204 TAM 9002001 (Jan. 12, 1990) (holding that despite Pennsylvania law disallowing
administration deductions for loans taken to pay state inheritance taxes, the probate
court allowed the expense as “proper,” and the expense therefore met the § 2053
requirement).
205 Estate of Park v. Comm’r, 475 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir. 1973).
206 Estate of Millikin v. Comm’r, 125 F.3d 339, 345-346 (6th Cir. 1997).
207 See e.g., Estate of Love v. Comm’r, 923 F.2d 335, 337 (4th Cir. 1991); Marcus v.
DeWitt, 704 F.2d 1227, 1229-30 (11th Cir. 1983); Hibernia Bank v. United States, 581
F.2d 741, 744-45 (9th Cir. 1978); Estate of Smith v. Comm’r, 510 F.2d 479, 482-83 (2d Cir.
1975); (see also a more recent Second Circuit decision, Estate of Grant v. Commissioner,
294 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2002)); Pitner v. United States, 388 F.2d 651, 659 (5th Cir. 1967).
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Park based itself, determined that the “as allowable by the laws of the
jurisdiction” language in § 2053(a) constitutes a threshold provision
rather than an exclusive provision.208 The Millikin court laid out a two
part test for allowable administration expenses: 1) the expense must be
one of the four enumerated expenses listed in § 2053(a) (and as defined

But see Estate of Jenner v. Comm’r, 577 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1978), which the Millikin
court read as possibly implying that whether an administration expense is allowed is a
determination for state law alone to make. Millikin, 125 F.3d at 344. The Service has
treated Jenner as a holding for state law determination only. See TAM 8636100 (Dec. 31,
1985). Legislative history of § 2053(a)(2) (administration expenses) indicates that state
law governs deductibility, but does not address the question of whether a Federal necessity test also exists. In the 1980s a more significant circuit split on the issue existed than
exists today, with the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, as well as the Tax Court holding
that there was a Federal necessity requirement. Id. The Tax Court reasoned in Estate of
Posen v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 355 (1980), that Congress would not have intended to
have its Estate Tax policy subverted by the “vagaries of state law” which might have
other interests in mind. Posen, 17 T.C. at 368. (This reasoning, of course, leaves open the
question of what Congress meant by its “laws of the jurisdiction” language. The court
may have considered the statutory language to be a floor and not a ceiling, as in Millikin.)
See Paul L. Caron, Note, The Estate Tax Deduction for Administration Expenses: Reformulating Complementary Roles for Federal and State Law under I.R.C. § 2053(A)(2), 67
CORNELL L. REV. 981, 1004 (1982) (critiquing the court’s analysis in Posen). The Fourth,
Sixth and (possibly) Seventh circuits held that state law comprised both the beginning
and the end of the inquiry. In I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,262 (Feb. 1, 1980), the Service
unsurprisingly opined that the Sixth and the Seventh circuit opinions left the door open
to abuse because of state courts’ “notoriously liberal” allowance for expenses. Paul L.
Caron, Must an Administration Expense Allowed by State Law also Meet a Federal Necessity Test?, 70 J. TAX’N 352, 353 (1989) (quoting I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,262) [hereinafter Caron, Federal Necessity Test]. For an excellent treatment of the circuit split as it
stood in 1992, including a more extensive discussion of the underlying rationales for each
position, see Michael H. Tow, Note, Estate of Love and § 2053(a)(2): Why State Law
Should Control the Determination of Deductible Administration Expenses, 12 VA. TAX
REV. 283 (1992) (analyzing the circuit split in light of the Fourth Circuit’s adoption of the
Federal inquiry interpretation of § 2053(a)(2) in Estate of Love v. Commissioner, 923
F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1991), and arguing for a state law control interpretation). See also
I.R.S. 1989 Litig. Guideline Mem. TL-65, 11-15 (Mar. 14, 1989).
208 Millikin, 125 F.3d at 345-46. The court also relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984). There, the Supreme Court held that when Congress does not directly address an
issue in the statute or is ambiguous in its language, courts must not impose their own
interpretation of the statute. Rather, they must consider whether the relevant agency’s
regulatory elucidation of the issue is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. This implied to the Millikin court that the statutory language of “administration expenses,” being ambiguous and not self-defining, deserved further elucidation through I.R.S. regulations, and that Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a) language
defining allowable administration expenses to be only those “actually and necessarily
incurred in the administration. . .” to be based on a permissible construction of the statute. The court therefore found the regulation to be binding. Millikin, 125 F.3d at 344.
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by I.R.S. regulations),209 and 2) the expense must be allowable by the
laws of the jurisdiction.210
Another question relevant to State law determinations, (whether
they are considered a threshold provision as is the near-universal rule
today or whether they are dispositive as to Federal deductions as well),
is to what extent State law determinations of an expense’s allowability
can be challenged by the Service and overturned by Federal courts.
Under Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch,211 the possibility exists for the
Service and Federal courts to reexamine applications of State law made
by State probate courts after giving “proper regard” to the State court’s
decision.212 Recent 2009 Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-1(b)(3)(i) provides that deductions for reasonable expenses of administration which
are otherwise allowable under § 2053 will not be denied for failure of a
court to enter a decree that the loan was allowable under local law (as
long as no such decree is required under local law).213 The regulation
also provides that the Service will respect decrees for the amount of an
expense or claim, as long as the court is of competent jurisdiction and
“actually passes upon the facts on which deductibility depends.”214 The
209 That is, “1) for funeral expenses, 2) for administration expenses, 3) for claims
against the estate, and 4) for unpaid mortgages on, or any indebtedness in respect of,
property where the value of the decedent’s interest therein, undiminished by such mortgage or indebtedness, is included in the value of the gross estate.” § 2053(a)(1)-(4).
210 Millikin, 125 F.3d at 344. See also Robert E. Madden & Lisa H. R. Hayes, Sixth
Circuit Fashions Two-Part Test for Deductibility of Administration Expenses, 25 EST.
PLAN. 30 (1998).
211 Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
212 Id. at 464. See also Caron, Federal Necessity Test, supra note 207, at 352. If the
state law determination is made by the highest court of the state, however, that decision
is usually respected in Federal court as well. Nudelman, supra note 21, at 349. In Estate
of Sturgis v. Commissioner, for instance, (though not citing directly to Bosch), the court
held that State court permission to take a loan as an administration expense is not binding for Federal estate tax purposes, that State law permission is necessary but not sufficient, and that Federal courts must make their own determination as to whether the
deduction is permitted. T.C. Memo. 1987-415, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 221 (1987). See also
Hibernia Bank, 581 F.2d at 748 (Duniway, J., concurring). Michael Tow argues that
Bosch, which is applicable to § 2056, cannot be generalized to § 2053. He further argues
that § 2053’s explicit language about laws of the jurisdiction make it a clear exception to
Bosch. Tow, supra note 207, at 288-89.
213 A cautious administrator of an estate might want to consider securing such a decree, however, to avoid possible future arguments from the Commissioner that the loan
violated local law.
214 Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(3)(ii). Though the regulations give some indication as
to when this “actually passed” standard is met (an “active and genuine contest” on the
issue will be considered evidence), it is still unclear when exactly the Service will respect
State court determinations. See note 213. See Rubin, supra note 92, at 144 (suggesting
that hiring separate counsel and evidence of negotiations can help meet this standard, or
in the alternative using a consent decree for all adverse parties). A consent decree from
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recent regulations hedge, however, first by saying that an “unreasonable” result will be seen as rebuttable evidence that there was no true
contest on which the State court passed (implying that the State court
did not pass on the facts on which deductibility depends), and then by
making deductibility subject to “any applicable limitations” of this section of the regulations.215 The question of whether property is subject
to claims is also determined by state law.216
State laws might permit estates to take loans in order to pay estate
taxes directly in a statute, by permitting estate tax and administration
expense “pay from” clauses in decedent’s wills, or by requiring a court
order. In Estate of Keller,217 the court looked to Texas State law, which
provided that executors must follow the instructions of the will to pay
estate taxes and administration expenses from where the decedent
wished.218 Thus the “allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction” clause of
§ 2053(a) was met, and the interest payment expenses were deductible.219 In Estate of Thompson,220 the court took a provision of the will
stating that the executor could borrow money without a court order for
any purpose the fiduciary deems proper to indicate an authorization to
take a loan to pay estate taxes. Without such a will provision, however,
the court would have held the loan to not be an allowable expense under
state law.221 The Georgia law in question required either prior court
approval in the form of a judicial order or an express will provision to
allow borrowing.222 In McKee v. Commissioner,223 the decedent’s will
incorporated the State code section which provided executors with the
power to take loans to pay expenses of the estate. The court took this as
all parties adverse to the claimant will be presumed to resolve a bona fide issue in genuine contest (subject to “all applicable limitations in this section”). Treas. Reg. § 20.20531(b)(3)(iii).
215 Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(3)(i).
216 Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(c) (providing that administration expenses and claims
against the estate are limited to “amounts which would be property allowable out of
property subject to claims by the law of the jurisdiction under which the decedent’s estate
is being administered.”) See also Wilson v. United States, 372 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1967);
Estate of Weber v. Comm’r, 29 T.C. 1170 (1958); Estate of Haggett v. Comm’r, 14 T.C.
325 (1950); Estate of Hirsch v. Comm’r, 14 T.C. 509 (1950); PLR. 9123024 (June 7, 1991)
(discussed supra at note 184).
217 Keller v. United States, No. V-02-62, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95500 (S.D. Tex.
Sept. 14, 2010).
218 Id. at *16-17.
219 Id.
220 Estate of Thompson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-325, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 426
(1998).
221 Id. at 432.
222 Id.
223 McKee v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-362, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 324 (1996).
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evidence of the decedent’s intent to allow the executors broad powers to
take such loans.224
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has discussed the deductibility of interest expenses incurred on loans taken to pay estate taxes, primarily as § 2053(a) administration expenses. Through case law, regulations, and I.R.S. materials,
this paper has developed the three main requirements for deductibility
in detail: 1) that the expense is necessary for the administration of the
estate, 2) that the expense is actually incurred, and 3) that it is allowed
by the laws of the jurisdiction.
Under the necessity prong, the prima facie bases for necessity are
the estate’s illiquidity, liquidity needs, and forced asset sale alternatives
to taking a loan. Though some courts have given deference to executors’ business judgment, others have not. If a court does second guess
the executors’ decision to take a loan, there are several grounds on
which a lack of true necessity for a loan can be found. If the illiquidity
was created by executors for no other purpose than generating a tax
deduction, if the loan was solely of benefit to the beneficiaries of the
estate, or if the loan was not bona fide based on objective tests of facts
and circumstances, deductions for interest expenses on the loan will
likely be denied.
Under the actuality prong, if the estate was not the true borrower,
the interest expense was never actually incurred and is therefore not
224 Id. at 329. A possible reading of the opinion could be to imply that, under Tennessee law, if the will had not incorporated the State law provision, the testator’s intent to
allow the executors to take the expense could not have been inferred, and the expenses
might have been disallowed under State law, despite the explicit State code provision
permitting it. Id. Incorporating the State code section (if not granting loan-taking powers even more explicitly) might be a prudent step for drafters to take to clarify the decedent’s intent. See Thompson, T.C. Memo. 1998-325, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 432-33
(discussed supra at text accompanying notes 220-22).
In another example of a Federal court applying state law, the court in Estate of
Gilman v. Commissioner held that the estate was not insolvent, (that is, its liabilities
exceeding its assets), but only illiquid, and therefore held to be inapplicable, by its own
terms, a New York law requiring that if an executor of an insolvent estate made distributions from residue which the testator designated for paying estate expenses, the residuary
beneficiaries must return the distributions so that estate taxes can be paid. Estate of
Gilman v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-286, 86 T.C.M. (RIA) 1814 (2004). The State law
allowability requirement also can involve State conflicts of law issues in determining the
“local law” of the jurisdiction. For instance, the law of the jurisdiction of the domiciliary
of the probate estate could govern, or the jurisdiction under which a living trust or nonprobate property would be administered could govern. The settlor of a trust can designate a jurisdiction. Connell v. U.S. Steel Corp., 516 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1975). See generally BENDER, supra note 172, § 39.07(4)(b).

Winter 2011]

ESTATE TAX DEDUCTIONS

457

deductible. If future interest expenses are not ascertainable with reasonable certainty and will be paid, deductions will only be allowed as the
interest is actually incurred and paid over the term of the loan, which
may require filing a protective refund claim.
Finally, under the State law allowability prong, local law must permit the expense to be incurred. With proper planning, decedents and
estate administrators can use § 2053(a) estate tax administration expense deductions for interest incurred on loans taken to pay estate taxes
to great effect. They can be a useful tool to maintain family owned businesses and to preserve illiquid assets in an estate despite the estate’s
present estate tax obligations, and they can also be an effective way to
save on estate taxes.
POSTSCRIPT
In the year and a half since this paper was written, there have been
a number of reported cases and one published Revenue Procedure addressing the relevant issues. The following is a brief summary of the
novel or noteworthy in them.
Estate of Duncan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-255,102 T.C.M.
(CCH) 421 (2011).
In Estate of Duncan, the decedent’s irrevocable trust (created for
decedent by decedent’s father) made a 15 year Graegin loan (prepayment prohibited) to the decedent’s revocable trust (created by decedent) so that the revocable trust could pay the estate tax. The loan was
needed because the estate was illiquid and needed a cash reserve to satisfy other ongoing obligations.225
On the question of whether the debt was bona fide, the court emphasized that the Graegin factors are helpful “objective criteria” for the
court’s facts and circumstances analysis, but are not exclusive. “The ultimate questions are whether there was a genuine intention to create a
debt with a reasonable expectation of repayment and whether that intention fits the economic reality of creating a debtor-creditor relationship.”226 The trusts in question had the same trustees and beneficiaries,
and their terms were nearly identical. Despite the complete identity of
interests, however, the court found that the trustees were required
under Illinois state trust law to act in each trust’s best interests and treat
225 In distinction from Estate of Lasarzig v. Commissioner, the revocable trust was
permitted to take the deduction because the trust’s assets were included in the gross
estate. See supra text accompanying notes 28 and 159-63.
226 Estate of Duncan v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2011-255, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 421, 424
(2011). Compare Geftman v. Comm’r, 154 F.3d 61(3rd Cir. 1998), discussed supra at text
accompanying notes 119-28.
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each trust individually, without commingling or improperly shifting the
assets in any way. Federal tax law also treated the trusts as separate.
Therefore the court held the loan to be bona fide and found that its
terms would “definitely” be enforced.227
The Commissioner also argued that the loan was not necessary because the revocable trust could have sold its illiquid assets to the irrevocable trust. For the same state trust law reasons, the court held that the
illiquid assets, if sold to the related trust, would have to have been sold
at the same forced sale discount as to a third party purchaser.228 The
court also rejected the Commissioner’s analogy to Estate of Black on
this point. In Estate of Black, the court had held a loan unnecessary
because the estate would have had to sell stock whether it took the loan
or not, meaning that the loan was not taken to avoid a forced sale, and
having no other economic effect, must have been taken solely to receive
a § 2053 interest expense deduction.229 In contrast, the Duncan revocable trust reasonably expected to generate the cash flow necessary to repay the loan 15 years later.
In fact, the revocable trust had generated enough cash to repay the
loan in only three years. The Commissioner argued, based on Estate of
Gilman, that the interest deduction must therefore be limited to three
years.230 The court rejected this contention. In Estate of Gilman the
estate held a promissory note due in 15.5 months that would have covered its estate taxes, but still took a 10 year loan in order to pay estate
taxes; therefore there was no necessity to pay interest on the loan beyond the 15.5 months. In Duncan, however, the executors were not reasonably certain that the estate would have enough money to repay the
loan early, because of the volatility of the illiquid assets (oil and gas
interests) in the revocable trust. All that mattered was the executors’
lack of reasonable certainty at the time they took the loan. The court
declined to use hindsight to second-guess them.231
The Commissioner also argued that the interest rate for the Duncan
loan was too high because instead of being at the long term Federal rate
of 5.02%, it was at a rate of 6.7% (still lower than the prime rate of
8.25%).232 The court held that the rate was appropriate because interest
rates typically reflect the debtor’s rather than the creditor’s characteris227

Duncan, T.C. Memo. 2011-255, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) at 421.
Id.
229 See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
230 See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
231 Duncan, T.C. Memo. 2011-255, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) at 425. See supra Section
II(A) (discussing executors’ business judgment).
232 Consider this in light of I.R.S. 1989 Litig. Guideline Mem. TL-65, 11-15 (Mar. 14,
1989), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 112-14.
228
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tics.233 While the federal government’s cost of borrowing was low because of its low risk of default, the trust’s cost of borrowing was higher
because of its comparatively higher risk of default. The Commissioner
also considered the interest rate unreasonable because it was not based
on negotiations. The court thought it would be “absurd” to require the
co-trustees of both trusts to “sit down and negotiate between themselves” because “[f]ormal negotiations would have amounted to nothing
more than playacting.”234 They had made a good-faith effort to select a
rate fair to both trusts, and the court refused to second guess their
judgment.235
Estate of Kahanic v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-81, 103 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1434 (2012).
In Estate of Kahanic, the decedent had several life insurance policies. The decedent’s ex-wife was the beneficiary under the policies. The
court held that the estate must include the value of the decedent’s life
insurance policy proceeds under § 2042 (pertaining to life insurance proceeds).236 The court allowed the estate to deduct the full value of the
insurance proceeds as indebtedness in respect of property included in
the gross estate, however, under § 2053(a)(4).237 Section 2053(c)(1)(A)
limits § 2053(a)(4) deductions to indebtedness that was contracted bona
fide and for full and adequate consideration in money or money’s worth.
The insurance proceeds were considered indebtedness because the decedent was required to make his ex-wife the beneficiary as part of a divorce decree. The indebtedness was deemed to be for full and adequate
consideration through the application of § 2043(b)(2), which deems
property transfers in satisfaction of certain written marital and property
rights agreements to be for full and adequate consideration. The court
noted that the policy rationale for the consideration requirement is to
prevent estate depletion by use of agreements in order to avoid paying

233

Estate of Duncan v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2011-255, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 421, 425

(2011).
234

See id. at 425.
See discussion of executors’ business judgment supra Section II(A). Accord Estate of Graegin v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1988-477, 56 T.C.M. 387 (1988) (discussed supra
at text accompanying notes 129-36).
236 Estate of Kahanic v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2012-81, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1434, 1442
(2012).
237 § 2053(a)(4) allows deductions “for unpaid mortgages on, or any indebtedness in
respect of, property where the value of the decedent’s interest therein, undiminished by
such mortgage or indebtedness, is included in the value of the gross estate.”
235
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estate taxes; there was no evidence that the parties to the divorce agreement had any tax avoidance motive.238
The estate also took a loan from the decedent’s ex-wife in order to
pay its federal and state estate taxes. Though the terms of the loan were
otherwise sufficient to indicate that it was bona fide, the decedent’s exwife never demanded repayment because the estate’s finances deteriorated severely after it took the loan. (Demanding repayment would
have drained the estate of its remaining assets, rendering it unable to
continue the Tax Court litigation and possibly subjecting the ex-wife to
transferee liability.) The court held that what mattered under the bona
fide analysis was whether the creditor and debtor expected repayment
to occur at the time of the loan, not whether the loan would actually be
repaid.239 Because the estate had sufficient assets to repay the loan (albeit in illiquid form) at the time it took the loan, and because both the
estate and the decedent’s ex-wife intended and expected the loan to be
repaid at that time, (and it would have been repaid but for unforeseen
circumstances), the court held the loan to be bona fide.
The Commissioner argued that the accrued interest would not be
paid.240 The court first acknowledged that the estate’s liabilities exceeded its assets. Fascinatingly, the court noted that if the principal
amount of the loan were ignored, the estate would have the funds necessary to pay the interest. Indeed, the loan terms provided that the principal would not be paid until the accrued interest liability had been
satisfied; all repayments were to be first applied to interest. Thus, even
if the loan could not be paid in full, the interest could (and presumably
would, based on the estate’s “credibl[e] state[ment]”) be paid in full,
rendering the expected interest payments deductible.241 Failure to
make any payments by the time of trial did not, according to the court,
impair the estate’s credibility in promising to pay the interest in the future, because the estate had only failed to repay thus far because of the
uncertainty of the proceedings before the Tax Court (in combination
with the deterioration of the estate’s financial condition).242
238 Compare Keller v. United States, No. V-02-62, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73789 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 20, 2009) and Keller v. United States, No. V-02-62, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95500
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2010), discussed supra at notes 57 and 72 and accompanying text. See
also supra note 73.
239 Accord Estate of Duncan v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2011-255, 102 T.C.M. (CCH)
421, 424 (2011) (discussed supra at text accompanying notes 225-35). See supra Section
II(A) (discussion of executors’ business judgment).
240 See supra text accompanying notes 187-93, and notes 199-201 and accompanying
text.
241 Kahanic, T.C. Memo. 2012-81, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1445.
242 Id. at 1444.
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The Commissioner also argued that the loan was not actually and
reasonably necessary because, under § 2206, the estate had the right to
recover from the life insurance beneficiary in order to cover the portion
of estate taxes paid that were attributable to the life insurance.243 Section 2206 does not grant this right, however, when the will directs otherwise.244 In Estate of Kahanic, the decedent’s will had waived the right to
third party transferee contributions towards estate tax payments.
Therefore, the estate was not required to seek transferee contributions.
Moreover, the court held that the estate could only seek contribution
from beneficiaries (instead of taking a loan) if it had insufficient assets
in the residuary estate to pay its estate tax liabilities at the time it took
the loan.245 The Kahanic estate had sufficient (illiquid) assets to pay its
estate taxes at that time, so the estate had no right to seek contribution,
and the loan was found necessary.246
Finally, the court considered the necessity of taking a loan in order
to avoid a forced sale of the estate’s accounts receivable.247 The court
held that the estate was not required to sell its accounts receivable because it would have likely had to sell them at a deep discount.248 The
accounts receivable would have been discounted both for present value
and because of the uncertainty of their collectability. Ultimately, the
court held the accrued interest on the loan to be deductible under
§ 2053(a)(2).249
Keller v. United States, 697 F.3d 238 (5th Cir. 2012).
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision in favor of
the estate.250 Of note was how the court distinguished Estate of Black.
In Estate of Black, the court explained, loans from a related, family
owned corporation to the estate were found unnecessary because the
estate would have had to sell its stock (the estate’s “only meaningful
243 § 2206, titled “Liability of life insurance beneficiaries,” provides that “[u]nless the
decedent directs otherwise in his will, if any part of the gross estate on which tax has been
paid consists of proceeds of policies of insurance on the life of the decedent receivable by
a beneficiary other than the executor, the executor shall be entitled to recover from such
beneficiary such portion of the total tax paid as the proceeds of such policies bear to the
taxable estate.”
244 Id.
245 Estate of Kahanic v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2012-81, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1434,
1444-45 (2012).
246 Id. at 1445.
247 These consisted mainly of outstanding patient billing. See supra text accompanying notes 27-33.
248 Kahanic, T.C. Memo. 2012-81, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1445.
249 Id. at 1446.
250 See Keller v. United States, No. V-02-62, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73789 (S.D. Tex.
Aug. 20, 2009).
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remaining asset”) either in lieu of taking a loan or in order to repay the
loan.251 Because the sale of stock was inevitable, characterizing the
transfer as a loan constituted an “indirect use” of the stock in order to
generate a § 2053 interest expense deduction.252 In Keller, by contrast,
there was no inevitable need to sell or redeem the estate’s illiquid ranch
and mineral holdings, so taking a loan was not an “indirect use” of those
“classically illiquid assets.”253 The Commissioner also argued that the
loan from the FLP to the Keller estate could have been characterized as
a distribution, rendering the loan unnecessary. Without further elaboration, the court rejected this argument as “tak[ing] Black too far.”254
Revenue Procedure 2011-48, 2011-42 I.R.B. 527
This revenue procedure provides detailed guidance for filing protective claims for estate tax refunds based on § 2053 expenses.255
Among other significant provisions, the protective claim must be filed
within the § 6511 period of limitation.256 The expected expense must be
clearly identified and reasons for the delay in its actual payment must be
explained. Once the delay has been resolved or the amount of the expense has become reasonably certain, the Service must be notified
within 90 days. For recurring payments, this 90 day period begins on the
date of the final payment. Partial refunds may also be claimed once a
year based on payments in partial satisfaction of a § 2053 expense
liability.

251

See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
Keller v. United States, 697 F.3d 238, 247-48 (5th Cir. 2012). See Estate of Black
v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 340, 385 (2009) (discussing “indirect use”).
253 Keller, 697 F.3d at 247-48.
254 Id. at 248.
255 See supra notes 200-01.
256 See supra note 184.
252

